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Abstract. The objective of the analysis is the static (the database refers exclusively 
to year 1998) evaluation of the competitiveness of Romanian manufacturing, depending 
on the ownership-type. A ternary ownership-type structure is considered: the prevailing 
foreign-owned capital, the prevailing Romanian private capital and the prevailing state 
capital. The place, the share, the performance and the impact of the foreign ownership 
in the Romanian manufacturing are described.  
The methodology of the analysis is subordinated to the signification given here 
to the concept of competitiveness: "the capacity of producing and selling profitably, 
both on the domestic and international market". Moreover, taking into account the large 
share of losses in the '98 Romanian manufacturing (approximately one third of the 
firms, which account for approximately half of the total of fixed assets), two sectors 
were defined and individually analyzed: the sector of the profitable firms and the sector 
of the unprofitable firms. 
The relation of the turnover, the exports, the productivity, the investment, the 
materials, etc. with the profits and the losses are considered in connection to the 
ownership-type. Finally, a competitiveness criterion is defined. The criterion is 
implemented, taking into account the ownership-type, to evaluate the Romanian 






 The theoretical bacground of the relationship foreign direct investment-competitiveness 
 
I.1 Theoretical aspects 
 
The existence of a potential positive impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the 
competitiveness of host-countries is widely acknowledged by investing companies, authorities of 
recipient economies, analysts. Presenting the coordinates of such an impact is the subject of a quite 
large number of studies, which sustain with concrete examples the positive effects induced by FDI 
through: the transfer of a complex package of resources (capital, technology, management and 
marketing skills); opening access to new markets; inducing microeconomic restructuring; 
generating spillover effects for local partners, suppliers or clients of the foreign affiliate, or in the 
rest of the economy; increased revenues to the state budget; and boosting exports. Disagreement 
appears as soon as the word potential is left aside. Those who unconditionally place themselves on 
neo-liberal positions will plead for the effectiveness of a positive impact irrespective of conditions. 
The anti-globalists will deny a priori such an impact, while, on a third position, are to be found 
those analysts who considers that assessments should be made only by a case-by-case approach. 
According to this third opinion, there are no generally accepted conclusions concerning the gains of 
the host-countries from FDI. These will depend on the concrete situation determined, on one hand, 
by the capabilities, interests and strategy of the investing firm and, on the other hand, by the 
development stage, the characteristics of the economic environment and the policies of the recipient 
state. 
 
This paper addresses the specific aspect of FDI-competitiveness linkage under the major objective 
of Romania in the following years, that is joining the EU. Or, in its economic dimension, this 
process mostly depends on the speed at which the Romanian economy will be restructured and 
become more competitive. As shown before, foreign capital can play an important role in the 
respective process. We intend to evaluate the current effects of FDI on the competitiveness of the 
Romanian economy both at microeconomic level, that is at recipient firms level, and at 
macroeconomic level, that is their restructuring impact through a better allocation of resources.    
 
The theoretical framework in which the restructuring role of FDI is more recently and frequently 
grounded is the competitive advantage theory of Michael Porter (Porter, 1992). Porter considers that 
the increased mobility of production factors and the major role of innovation in all respects 
(especially in what information technologies are concerned) severely limit the explanatory capacity 
of the neoclassical theory of international trade and the validity of its recommendation that 
countries should specialize according to their production factors endowment. Being competitive has 
become less a problem of maximizing results within a given environment and more and more a 
dynamic challenge for states and firms to generate innovation, to create new factors and to improve 
the existing ones. Porter designs his own structure of determinants of the competitive advantage of 
nations, at industry level. He considers competitiveness to reside mainly in the productivity with 
which a nation makes use of its resources in a certain economic activity. The competitive advantage 
are determined by that level of productivity that allows local firms to generate substantial and 
sustained exports to a significant number of countries or important FDI flows. At this point, we 
would like to stress a fact that derives from Porter's work and also from Dunning's important 
contributions to the study of international production and FDI effects in host-economies: not only 
the generation of FDI, but also, even if at a different scale, receiving FDI is a measure of the 
competitiveness of an economy. 
 
Porter's theory supports the idea that, despite the globalization of production and trade, the 
competitive advantage is created in a national framework, nations, through their institutional, 
natural, cultural, economic characteristics ultimately determining the development of certain 
economic activities. The factors considered by Porter as determinants for the competitive advantage 
are grouped in four categories, the linkages between them being important as well. The system as a 
whole has a diamond type structure which also gives the name of Porter's model. The four 
categories of decisive factors for creating and sustaining national competitive advantages are the 
following (Porter, 1992, p.69-131): 
 
F1. production factor endowment: human resources, both under a quantitative and qualitative 
aspect; natural resources; technical, scientific, market knowledge; capital- availability, cost, 
structure of the financial market; physical and business infrastructure. Given the present 
sophistication of production organization, the direct access to production factors no more represents 
a condition of competitiveness. Factor mobility, the prime role of created factors, especially 
technology, a sustained innovative process of creating new factors are presently such conditions; 
F2. home demand characteristics, that is its level and structure, its degree of sophistication, its 
capacity of formulating anticipative needs. Home market expectations put pressure on the sellers, 
determining them to improve their offer, while demand anticipative requirements, anticipative as 
against other markets, can make home products competitive, through exports and FDI; 
F3. the level of development of related and supporting industries. The competitive advantage in 
a certain industry is also determined by the performance of supplying or beneficiary industries; 
F4. firms structures and strategies and home rivalry. This forth category of determinants is 
linked to the managerial culture as a factor which can influence firm organization and way of 
operation and as a potential source of competitive advantage. A managerial culture, which 
encourages a high degree of moral commitment of the members of an organization, reduces the 
need for mutual surveillance and encourages cooperation among the members of the organization. 
While a set of principles which stresses respect of the authority at the cost of respect of the others 
will enhance the efficiency of hierarchies. Managerial culture is expressed by firm organization  and 
way of operation but most of the firms don't create the culture, they inherit it. The British author 
Mark Casson (Casson, 1990, p.88-94), distinguishes between: (i) the technical aspects of a culture, 
which include a scientific outlook and influence the individuals' and firms' perception of the 
environment and hence the quality of the decision-making process in both the economic and 
technological spheres and (ii) the moral values of the society which influence economic 
performance by legitimating certain general principles of behavior and also by encouraging 
entrepreneurial commitments and determining the intensity with which individuals strive to honor 
these commitments. Some moral attitudes are far more entrepreneurial than others. The philosophy 
of voluntarism, for example, which legitimates the freedom of business is more favorable to the 
development of the entrepreneurial spirit than a value system which concentrates the coercive 
powers on institutions such as the state. 
 
A competitive climate is decisive for creating and maintaining the competitive advantages of firms, 
because they are the economic actors whose performance on international markets substantiates the 
competitive advantages of a nation. Local rivalry is more visible and more direct than the 
international one and at least as important as this one.  
 
In function of the main source of the competitive advantage at a certain moment, Porter defines the 
stages of development of a nation. In the presentation of these stages and of the role FDI can play 
we'll also take into account the contributions of John Dunning  (1993, p.272-276) and of the 
Japanese author Terutomo Ozawa (Ozawa, 1992, apud  Dunning, 1993, p.272). 
 
S1. The stage of the production factor - driven competitive advantage. According to Porter's 
model, the first development stage is the production factor driven competitive advantage. He 
considers that the great majority of developing countries as well as the former centrally-planned 
economies from Eastern and Central Europe were in this stage at the beginning of the '90s. More 
than this, countries such as Canada and Australia were, according to the main source of competitive 
advantages, in the same first stage of development. Dunning shows that in this phase, FDI will be 
directed towards the primary sector and towards low-qualified labor-intensive manufacturing 
activities. It is a stage in which created production factors are scarce and hence their contribution in 
the economy is a modest one. In terms of policies, the states in this phase tend not to impose 
restrictions or performance criteria on FDI inflows. It is true that the lower the level of high national 
capabilities, the greater is the risk of enclave creation through FDI in the host-countries. 
 
S2. The stage of the investment - driven competitive advantage. In this phase, the competitive 
advantages are mainly determined by the volume and quality of investments in modern technologies 
and production facilities, in developing a competitive physical and business infrastructure. 
According to Dunning, in this second stage of development, domestic investment share in gross 
domestic product (GDP) may rise from 5-8% to 15-20% (Dunning, 1993, p. 273). At the same time, 
there is an increase of expenditure on secondary education, public utilities, transport and 
communications. In this development stage, the sources of competitive advantages are likely to shift 
towards capital-intensive sectors, such as basic chemicals, iron and steel and ship-building; some 
smaller scale mechanical engineering activities; and the production of labor-intensive, but 
moderately knowledge-intensive consumer goods, such as electrical products, clothing, leather 
goods, processed foods and cigarettes. 
  
The role of foreign capital will mainly depend on the development strategy promoted by the 
recipient countries governments. The options of the Japanese and South-Korean authorities in the 
'50s were to restrict the amount of inward investment and develop their own asset capabilities. On 
the contrary, starting with the '60s, Ireland integrated FDI into its industrial development policy, 
succeeding in improving its economic performance, including the sharp increase of exports of 
electronic and pharmaceutical products. FDI inflows can play the role of initially stirring certain 
economic activities, generating "virtuous" circles of asset accumulation. The development of 
connection activities may also be sustained through FDI infusion or –on the contrary, which is the 
situation to be preferred– by local firms. 
 
S3. The stage of the innovation - driven competitive advantage. Within Porter's model, the 
intensive investment phase is followed by the stage in which the competitive advantage of a nation 
mainly derives from its capacity to innovate. It is the phase in which the technological and 
managerial progress and the updating of the production facilities are mainly undertaken by 
indigenous firms. Local firms are now capable to compete in more and more specialized and narrow 
market segments, on the basis of global strategies, under the positive impact of a sophisticated local 
demand. Activities that rely on traditional production factors are transferred beyond the national 
borders. Most of the developed states are or have already passed over this stage. The localization of 
the innovative process doesn't mean that FDI can no more play a role in the development of host – 
economies. The increased mobility of competitive advantages in today world economy allows firms 
to develop specific ownership advantages which can be successfully used in innovation stage 
economies. 
 
S4. As far as the next development stage is concerned, Porter's opinion differs from that of 
Dunning. Porter's model includes as the last stage of the development cycle the welfare phase. 
Welfare by itself is likely to cancel the motivation for sustained investment and innovation. 
Competitive advantages are more and more volatile and the return to the first stage of development, 
based on production factors and their costs become necessary. Porter considers that this is the case 
of Great Britain in which, at the beginning of the '90s, the low cost of the labor force played such a 
role. At its turn, Italy ran through the whole cycle, presently covering the innovation – led 
development stage. 
 
In Dunning investment cycle path, the final and most advanced stage of economic development is 
the information processing stage, also called the post – industrial or services stage of development 
(Dunning, 1993, p. 274). Nevertheless, the author admits that countries like US, Japan, Norway and 
Germany, which according to his model are in this last stage, also meet the most significant 
conditions that place them in the innovation stage. They remain the leading spenders on research 
and development activities, which, for the most part, are directed towards the innovation of new 
products and production methods. 
 
There should be also mentioned the fact that given the radical technological advances in computing 
and telecommunications, the traditional borders between manufacturing industries and services are 
likely to disappear. A proof in this respect is the increased content in services of material goods. In 
our opinion, all these indicate the possibility of considering the information processing stage as a 
superior phase of the innovation – led stage in Porter's model. Irrespective of its condition as a 
distinctive phase or an integral part of the third development stage in Porter's theory, the 
development of information processes strongly increases the number of linkages among companies. 
The success of countries in accumulating productive assets is depending more and more on local 
ability to coordinate the use of resources in a regional and even global environment. In this phase, 
the effects of FDI inflows in recipient countries are to be valued not only in terms of resource 
transfer, but mainly in terms of organizational practices and skills which can benefit by means of 
spillover effects the abilities and efficiency of local firms. 
 
The sequence of development stages doesn't apply as such to all states; Dunning doesn't exclude the 
possibility for certain states to straddle more than one stage at a time. More than this, within a 
country, different regions may be at different stages of development. 
 
Porter's model and Dunning's considerations theoretically substantiate the approach to FDI – 
competitiveness relation in Romania. The assumption we start from – assumption that we intend to 
evaluate as true or not – is that Romania is at the first stage of development, stage in which its 
competitive advantages are determined by production factor endowment and by the low cost of the 
respective factors. According to Porter and Dunning, in this stage, FDI are oriented towards primary 
production processes and towards manufacturing activities based on the low cost of the labor force, 
being able to play an important role in enhancing the economic performance and in improving the 
production factors quality. The centrally planned economies disposed to a very little extent, if at all, 
of the mechanics allowing for the creation of specialized production factors. The lack of domestic 
competition, the restriction or even the total call off of the demand role in the economy – not to 
speak of a possible pressure put on suppliers by a sophisticated demand –, the allocation of 
resources on non-economic criteria, all these led to competitive advantages based exclusively on 
factor cost and located in standardized market segments. As shown before, according to Michael 
Porter, transition economies are at the first stage of development of their competitive advantages. 
His opinion is shared by East-European analysts like Ferenç Vissi, once the president of the 
Competition Office in Hungary who brings about some new aspects, correlating the sequence of 
development stages with the degree of exposure of a country to the competition on international 
markets (Chikán and others, 1998, p. 12-13). While analyzing the place and role of foreign trade in 
Romania's economic development, the economist Valentin Cojanu approaches the problem of the 
competitive advantage stage of the Romanian economy. His conclusion is in conformity with the 
above-mentioned assumption. Romania, a country with economy in transition was in the first half of 
'90,  at the first stage of development of its competitive advantage,  stage based on the production 
factors endowment and their low costs. The author considers that, unfortunately, the actual potential 
of the Romanian economy doesn't allow for "its rapid development and advance towards superior 
stages" (based on investment and innovation) (Valentin Cojanu, 1997, p.208). 
 
I.2 Approach directions 
 
Our paper approaches the relationship between FDI and competitiveness only in the manufacturing 
industry. The reasons for this limitation reside in the fact that the restructuring impact of FDI flows 
as well as their spillover effects in the rest of the economy depend, to a great extent, on the volume 
and quality of the FDI flows in manufacturing. 
 
Four main directions of analysis, D1 – D4 will be approached 
 
D1. Our analysis starts with a secondary, but still necessary step with respect to the objectives of the 
paper: defining the place, the share of the foreign sector in the Romanian manufacturing, at a 
general level, as well at NACE subsection level. By this, we intend we examine the validity of 
Dunning assertion that in the first development stage, FDI flows are mainly directed to low value-
added manufacturing activities, which turn into account the low cost of labor force. 
 
D2. The second natural coordinate of the analysis refers to FDI impact on the economic 
performance of recipient firms, the point from which every debate concerning FDI effects should 
start from. Given the fact that the great majority of FDI in Romania have been made in existing 
companies or within the privatization process and not in the form of greenfield investments, a 
complete analysis should be a dynamic one. This would solve the problem of causality, 
discriminating between 1) FDI impact on economic performance of recipient firms –FDI impact on 
performance subsequently the FDI infusion– and 2) the degree of attraction of local firms by means 
of their economic performance, for foreign investors, which influence the investment decision 
before the infusion of FDI. 
 
A correct approach of the subject should include the examination of the performance of the same 
company before and after receiving foreign capital. Unfortunately, some problems make difficult if 
not impossible for the time being such an approach: changing the ownership structure involves 
more than one stage (in Romania, joined ownership has still got an important share); there is an 
objective transition period after the infusion of foreign capital, transition whose impact on firms' 
performance cannot be neglected. Such restrictions would require a larger time span, which in 
Romania's case doesn't exist: the opening of the economy has only started at the beginning of the 
'90s. An alternative solution would be a case-by-case approach, which is not what we intend to do. 
 
Most of the analysis carried on by east-European economists, including Romanian ones, are based 
on comparing the performance of companies with foreign capital with the average industry 
performance, or with the performance of local firms. To a great extent, this aspect was covered   
(Boşcaiu and others, 2000). Some of the conclusions of this study, relevant for the problems of 
competitiveness are to be interpreted and used in our paper too. 
 
D3. At a third tier, we intend to deepen the analysis of competitiveness at the level of NACE 
divisions in manufacturing. The starting point consists in the observation that the condition of 
factors F1-F4 is reflected in the profitability of manufacturing and at firm level in the value of 
profits or in that of losses. In this respect, the analysis of profits and losses is an important part of 
the competitiveness analysis. In the analysis, we'll not explicitly approach the four categories of 
competitiveness determinants (factors F1-F4 mentioned above), but we'll analyze in detail the 
profits and losses according to the ownership type. 
 
D4. Finally, we intend to determine the FDI role in the efficient allocation of economic resources 
within manufacturing, inclusively by comparison with the allocation carried on by companies with 
prevailing domestic capital. Specific indices will be used, among which the allocation diversity 
ratio. 
 
1.3 Methodological comments 
 
M1. Defining the ownership  structure of the company. The first specification to be made refers 
to the ownership structure of the company. As far as the binary model "companies with foreign 
participation versus domestic companies" is not valid because of the lack of homogeneity of local 
capital, a ternary approach will be followed: 
-prevailing state-owned companies (abbreviated STATE), 
-prevailing private-owned domestic companies (abbreviated PrivRO), 
-prevailing foreign-owned companies (abbreviated FOR). 
These abbreviations will be systematically used in the paper (although licences according to the 
literary expression standards,  abbreviations have the advantage of facilitating reading). 
The term "prevailing" is used to identify the main source of the capital. Theoretically, prevailing 
foreign-owned companies (or, similarly, "prevailing state", or "prevailing domestic private") means 
the possession of at least 34% of the equity capital, but, in most cases, (in Romania), it is equivalent 
to the majority capital (more exactly, if the equity capital belongs to a certain ownership form in 
proportion of over 34%, than, in most cases, the respective ownership form represents over 50% of 
the equity capital). This approach is necessary to make possible the covering, within the analysis, of 
the companies with a joined ownership structure whose frequency in the Romanian manufacturing 
industry was in 1998 (and still remains) important.  
M2. Description of the sample. Initially, there have been taken into account all the 
approximatively 2900 firms in manufacturing which, in 1997 and 1998, had an average number of 
employees of at least 50 people. Subsequently, there were excluded approximatively 120 firms from 
various reasons:  incomplete, incorrect  information, outliers or because in 1998 the weight of the 
trade activities in the turnover  was of over 50% (although, according to the main object of activity 
declared, the firms belonged to manufacturing). Therefor, finally, a sample of 2800 firms was 
accepted for the analysis. In order to ensure the homogeneity of the paper and the possibility of 
subsequent computing of other indices, starting from those computed within the study, all the 
aggregations were made for this sample, even if for some indices the available data would have 
permitted to use a larger sample. 
 
The initial intention was that the sample would be exhaustive, but finally, it wasn't (because of non-
responses, incomplete, incorrect or untypical data). Thus, the sample is neither exhaustive nore 
random. This doesn't raise major problems given the fact that, at each subsection level, our data 
base covers at least 80% of the turnover. The conclusions of our analysis can be, hence, considered 
as representative for the Romanian manufacturing as a whole. In what the subsection analysis is 
concerned, the results must be interpreted separately, in connection with the number of firms in 
each subsection (see Annex 2, Table 4). 
 
M3. The "sheep louse" firms, which parasite the Romanian industry were automatically removed 
from the data base, through the two selection  criteria: firms with at least 50 employees and a 
weight of trade activities less than 50%. 
M4. The data base at firm level which is used in this paper refers to the situation at the end of 1998. 
The analysis is nevertheless valid for the next two years as well, given the fact that FDI flows in 
1999-2000 registered similar levels: 818.5 million dollars in 1998, 930.6 million dollars in 1999 and 
865.1 million dollars in 2000 (The Trade and Industry Chamber of Romania, 2001. 
 
Chapter II 
The size and performance of the foreign sector in the Romanian manufacturing industry 
 
II.1 The size of the foreign sector in the Romanian manufacturing industry 
 
We will evaluate the share of the foreign sector FOR by examining he values of some parameters 
calculated in function of the three ownership types mentioned above. The following aspects will be 
taken into consideration: ownership structure of the capital, turnover, exports, investments, value-
added, profits, number of employees. Each firm is classified as belonging to a certain NACE 
subsection according to the main object of activity  (for the manufacturing industry, from EA, food, 
beverage and tobacco industry to EO, other industrial activities, see Table A1). The analysis refers 
to the situation at the end of 1998, but as shown before we consider it actual and valid for the 
present as well. 
 
Fixed asset distribution. At the manufacturing industry level, the FOR companies account for 
9.5% of the total fixed assets, against 29%, the PrivRO companies and 61.5%, the STATE 
companies. It is obvious that at the end of 1998, the share of FDI in the Romanian manufacturing 
industry was a low one. Nevertheless, at the level of NACE subsections, there are some branches in 
which the share of the predominantly foreign capital-FOR is higher: EM, electrical and optical 
equipment industry (27%); EI, industry of other products made of non-metallic minerals (20%); 
EG, chemical and synthetic and artificial fibers industry (18%); EA, food, beverage and tobacco 
industry (17,7%); EB, textile industry and of textile fabrics (17%). 
 
Turnover. The shares of the three ownership forms in the aggregate turnover for the manufacturing 
industry were at the end of 1998 the following: 47% - the STATE companies, 39%  - the PrivRO 
companies and 14% - the FOR companies. The highest shares of FOR were to be found in: EM, 
electrical and optical equipment industry (34.8%); EC, leather and footwear industry (28.6%); EA, 
food, beverage and tobacco industry (26.4%); EG, chemical and synthetic and artificial fibers 
industry (26%); EB, textile industry and of textile fabrics (22.1%). The lowest shares of FOR 
companies in the subsection turnover were in EF, EJ, EH, EL, and respectively EN as it follows: 
EF, industry of oil processing, coal coking and nuclear fuels processing - 0%; EJ, metallurgical 
industry – in 1998, only 0.1%, but the share increased afterwards; EH, rubber and plastics 
manufacturing industry - 4.1%; EL, machine and equipment building industry- 4.5% and, finally, 
EN, industry of transport vehicles - 5.6%. 
 
Exports. As regards the shares of FOR companies in exports of the subsections, the respective 
companies account for over 20% of the turnover- in the following branches: EB, EK, EM, EG, EC, 
ED and EE. The percentages are the followings: 28% in the textile industry and of textile fabrics; 
27% in the metal structures, metal products industry (except machines, equipment, installations); 
27% in the electrical and optical equipment industry; 25% in the chemical and synthetic and 
artificial fibers industry; 22% in the leather and footwear industry, in the wood working industry 
(except furniture) and in the cellulose, paper, cardboard, paper and cardboard products industry. For 
the manufacturing industry as a whole, over 50% of exports are generated by the STATE companies 
(approximately 52% of the STATE companies, while the PrivRO and FOR firms account for 34.5% 
and  13.4%, respectively). 
 
Investments. The contribution of FOR companies to the investment process was in 1998 of 23% 
for the manufacturing industry. Shares almost twice as big  were registered by the FOR sector in: 
EG, the chemical and synthetic and artificial fibers industry (49,6%); EC, leather and footwear 
industry (46,4%); EM, the electrical and optical equipment industry (44,5). The industry of other 
products made of non-metallic minerals- EI, the food, beverage and tobacco industry- EA, as well 
as the wood working industry (except furniture) also witness levels of over 30% of the FOR 
participation to investments. 
 
Value added. The participation of the FOR companies to the value added creation in the 
manufacturing industry is low, of only 12.9%. The highest level of this participation, of 31.4% is 
registered in EG, the chemical and synthetic and artificial fibres industry and the next, of 21.8% in 
EA, the food, beverage and tobacco industry. 
 
Profits. The FOR sector account for approximately one quarter (24.2%) of the profits value 
generated in the manufacturing industry. Their share is relatively high in the following subsections: 
EC, leather and footwear industry (48.2%); EM, electrical and optical equipment industry (40.8%); 
EG, chemical and synthetic and artificial fibres industry (38.5%), EA, food, beverage and tobacco 
industry ( 35.3%) and EB, textile industry and of textile fabrics (32.2%). 
 
Number of employees. The wholly domestic-owned firms, STATE and PrivRO, account, each 
group for around 46% of the workforce in the manufacturing industry, while the foreign sector 
employs only 8%. The most significant shares of the FOR are to be found in EB, the textile industry 
and of textile fabrics, EC, leather and footwear industry and EG, the chemical and synthetic and 
artificial fibres industry, with levels situated between 13-15%.   
 
II.2 The economic performance of FDI 
 
The immediate theoretical background of FDI impact on the performance of recipient firms and, as 
a result of spillover effects, on that of wholly domestic-owned companies, as well are to be clearly 
found in the monopolistic advantage theory and in the theory of internalization. Both theories try to 
explain foreign direct investment and international production starting from the existence, at firm 
level, of certain competitive advantages (monopolistic or oligopolistic advantages, including 
technological ones, the privileged access to financing or suppliers etc.) or internalization advantages 
that result from operating production assets within a common ownership and organizational 
structure. On the basis of such advantages, foreign firms are able more than to offset the difficulties 
of being present into a new foreign environment, facing the local competition and proving 
themselves to be profitable. The argument of the efficiency of foreign firms is even more visible as 
valid in the case of FDI motivated by the factor costs, as in such situations, foreign markets are the 
ones to confirm the competitiveness of the respective products.  
 
This subchapter carries out an analysis of FOR sector performance in comparison with PrivRO and 
STATE sectors. We intend to continue the analysis of FDI impact on competitiveness at 
microeconomic level by deepening the above findings at NACE subsection level. We'll try to 
identify, on one hand, the industrial branches in which the FOR companies register the best 
performance and, on the other hand, the branches in which the respective firms have a significant 
contribution to certain economic indices. In this respect, we'll compare the performance of the FOR 
firms with the PrivRO and STATE sectors.          
 
Labor productivity. Labor productivity is calculated as a ratio between value added and number of 
employees. In order to complete the above analysis, we'll resort to the labor productivity ratio 
(LPR), defined as an aggregate index at subsection level, calculated as a ratio between labor 
productivity by ownership and subsection labor productivity (see Def.1, Annex 1).  LPR is maximal 
for FOR companies in all the subsections of the manufacturing industry, with one exception, 
insignificant from a statistical point of view (in the case of rubber and plastics manufacturing 
industry). The highest levels of the LPR are registered by FOR firms in the following industries: 
chemical and synthetic and artificial fibers industry (237%); cellulose and paper industry (193%); 
food, beverage and tobacco industry (192%); electrical and optical equipment industry (183%); 
industry of transport vehicles (151%), as well as the machine and equipment building industry 
(204%, but in this case the share of the FOR sector is low). For the manufacturing industry as a 
whole, LPR value for FOR companies is 164%, compared to 96% in the case of the STATE firms 
and 93% in the case of PrivRO firms. 
 
Capital productivity. Capital productivity is calculated as the ratio between turnover and the value 
of fixed assets (machines, equipment and transport vehicles). The capital productivity ratio (KPR, 
see Def.1, Annex 1) is defined as an aggregate index at subsection level by the ratio between capital 
productivity by ownership type and the capital productivity for the subsection as a whole. KPR 
points out the superiority of FOR companies only in 4 out of the 15 subsections of the 
manufacturing industry: in the leather and footwear industry (112%); in the cellulose and paper 
industry (161%); in the chemical and synthetic and artificial fibers industry (227%); in the machine 
and equipment building industry (216%). For the entire manufacturing industry, the KPR of FOR 
companies is 125%, higher than that of Romanian STATE companies (76%), but lower than that of 
PrivRO companies (135%). 
 
Marginal productivity. The below conclusions refer to a Cobb-Douglas type model of the 
production function with four production factors (in a large sense), namely capital value, labour, 
value of materials and value of subcontracting: the production is defined by 
(Boscaiu and others, 2000). (Under this model, the marginal productivity of 
capital is αY/K, the product of α which describes the contribution of capital K in the production 
function and Y/K, a measure of capital productivity; similar results hold for L, M, S.) 
δγβα SMLAKY =
 
The marginal productivity of capital is significantly higher1 for the private firms (PrivRO or FOR) 
against the STATE ones, the difference between FOR and PrivRO being insignificant. The marginal 
productivity of the labor is higher in the PrivRO sector, without, this time, significant differences 
between STATE and FOR. The marginal productivity of materials (materials are described by the 
total cost of raw materials, materials, energy and water) is maximum for STATE companies and 
minimum for the FOR companies, all differences between the three ownership types being 
significant. These differences may be related to two aspects: export-import activities (taking into 
account that the share of imported materials is significantly higher for FOR firms and for the 
companies with regular exports) and, on the other hand, the share of value added in turnover (which 
is minimal for FOR firms). A final aspect revealed by the regression analysis refers to the marginal 
productivity of subcontracting, which is the highest for FOR companies, followed by PrivRO and 
STATE companies. This fact is important from the point of view of the integration of the foreign 
affiliated activity in the Romanian economy, subcontracting being one of the ways in which the 
degree of integration may rise. It is true that the other main way consists in buying raw materials 
and materials from the Romanian suppliers; it was shown before that as far as this criterion is 
concerned, FOR firms are on the last place. 
 
The analysis of the total productivity factor (TFP). We must have in mind that TFP covers all 
the causes that can alter productivity, others than those directly related to the production factors. 
TFP expresses the current level of technology as well as the efficiency of the organizational and 
managerial practices. In a previous study (Boscaiu and others, 2000, using a log-linear regression 
model) there has been found that the total productivity factor is significantly higher for the private 
firms (PrivRO or FOR) in comparison with the STATE companies. The difference between FOR 
and PrivRO is positive but not significant. 
 
Exports. Another set of conclusions refers to the frequency and intensity of export activities, which 
are maximal for FOR companies. More precisely, 47% of the FOR firms register an over 75% share 
of exports revenues in turnover, against only 18% of the PrivRO firms and 4,2% of the STATE 
companies (in number terms). This conclusion contradicts, at least in the case of the Romanian 
manufacturing industry, the quite spread perception that the main motivation of the companies with 
foreign participation is the domestic market. FOR companies mainly work for export in the 
following industries: textiles, metallurgical industry, machines and equipment building, transport 
vehicles and furniture. On the other hand, there are industries FOR companies work almost 
exclusively for the domestic market: food, beverage and tobacco industry (income from exports 
represents only 1% of the turnover), rubber and plastics manufacturing (10%), electrical and optical 
equipment(14%), cellulose and paper industry (21% of the turnover). At the aggregate level of the 
manufacturing industry, the highest share of export income in the turnover of 29% is generated, 
nevertheless, by STATE firms, against 25% in the case of FOR firms and 23.5% in that of PrivRO 
firms. A coherent interpretation of this apparently paradoxical situation asks to point out some 
aspects previously mentioned: the small numerical share of STATE companies (approximately 
25%), but the high share of their turnover (approximately 60% of the aggregate turnover of the 
manufacturing), the aggregate distribution of exports in the manufacturing industry (52% for 
STATE companies, 35% for PrivRO companies and 13% for FOR companies). This means that if 
almost half of the FOR firms account for the great majority of exports, the propensity for export of 
the other half is so low that, on the whole, the foreign sector performance is below, even if not 
much below, that of STATE companies (25% against 29%). 
 
For all exporting companies, the percentages of the export losing firms (in the sense that revenues 
from exports are smaller than expenses for exports) are 20% for STATE and FOR against 10% for 
PrivRO. Moreover, 25% of the FOR firms with substantial exports (more exactly, which export at 
                                                 
1 A “higher” value of the marginal productivity means a “higher” effect in the production function (a higher output) of 
an added unit of the considered resource. 
least 75% of the production), are exports losers. In this case, too, the situation of PrivRO firms is 
relatively better: the percentage of the export losing firms is of approximately 10%. 
 
Imports. The higher propensity for exports of FOR firms is accompanied by their higher inclination 
for imports as well. The share of imported materials (raw materials and materials, except energy 
and water) in the total expenditures of this kind of the company is significantly higher for the FOR 
sector. In the textile industry as well as in the leather and footwear industry – subsections with the 
highest levels of imported materials – the share of imported materials is 100% for more than half of 
the FOR companies. It should be also mentioned that the share of imported materials is higher for 
the firms with systematic exports, especially for those whose exports exceed 50% of the turnover. 
 
Investments. The level of investments represents another aspect to be taken into account when 
judging the companies' performance. The investment intensity is expressed by the share of the 
investments in turnover. The investment ratio (see Def.1, Annex 1) will defined as an index 
aggregated at subsection level by the ratio between the investment intensity by ownership type and 
investment intensity of the subsection. At the level of the manufacturing industry, the investment 
ratio of FOR companies (163%) is more than double compared to that of STATE companies and 
over 50% higher that that of PrivRO companies (108%). The highest level of the ratio registered by 
the FOR companies is to be found in the industry of transport vehicles: 435% (against only 74% for 
the STATE companies and 110% for PrivRO). Other subsections in which the contribution to 
investments of the FOR companies is higher than that for the manufacturing industry as a whole are 
the industry of other products made of non-metallic minerals (315% against 17% in the case of 
STATE companies and 102 in the case of PrivRO companies); wood working industry, except 
furniture (223% against 14% and 89%, respectively); and finally, chemical and synthetic and 
artificial fibers industry (191% against 61% and 85%, respectively). The industry in which the 
propensity for investment of the FOR companies is minimum, being, at the same time, 
uncharacteristic for this group of firms, is the metal structures and metal products industry, except 
machines, equipment, installations. The level of the ratio is of 24%, compared to 18% in the case of 
the STATE firms and 156% in the case of PrivRO firms. 
 
The share of value added in turnover. At aggregate level, the share of value added in turnover is 
the lowest for the FOR. The value added ratio (expressed by the respective share for each 
ownership type and the share at the manufacturing industry level, see Def.1, Annex 1) is of 91%, 
for the FOR firms, nevertheless quite close to that registered by the STATE Romanian firms, of 
93%. Both levels indicate a performance below the medium level (100%). The sector that achieves 
the best level of this index is the PrivRO sector, with a value of 112%. The FOR companies exceed 
the 100% level in the following subsections: chemical and synthetic and artificial fibers industry 
(121%), the industry of transport vehicles (109%) and the industry of other products made of non-
metallic minerals. 
 
II.3 Conclusions concerning the size and performance of the FOR sector  
 
The review of both the performance and share indices (see also Table A2 in the Annex 2) provides 
some important conclusions concerning the FOR sector. We mention them below. 
1. At an aggregate level, the weight of value added in turnover is minimal in FOR sector. This 
finding confirms the opinion according to which the foreign direct investments in Romania are 
mainly located in low value added activities. At the same time, at firm level, the share of imported 
materials is the highest for the FOR companies. These are two of the explanations of the low 
macroeconomic impact of foreign capital on the restructuring processes in the Romanian economy. 
 
2. In comparison with the domestic-controlled companies (STATE or PrivRO), the FOR firms are 
superior from the following points of view: their labor and capital productivity and the frequency of 
their export activities are higher (even if for manufacturing as a whole, the share of exports in 
turnover is maximum for the STATE sector); their investment effort (described as the ratio between 
investments value and turnover) is much higher compared to STATE and PrivRO and their 
management (at least in what their capacity of using subcontracting is concerned) is superior.                
 
3. In  Romania's case, there is obvious the existence of a number of superlatives of the FOR firms, 
compared to the companies controlled by the domestic capital. Nevertheless, on the other hand, the 
frequency of losses is higher for FOR than for PrivRO. As for the frequency of loss-making 
exports, this one is maximum for the FOR firms, also. Therefore, there is a polarized structure of 
the foreign-controlled companies. Thus, the profit-making firms are efficient and numerous enough 
to impose as a trend, at the aggregate level of the FOR sector, a number of superlatives concerning 
economic performance, and the unprofitable firms are numerous enough to significantly increase 
the frequency of losing firms.  
 
4. The polarization of the PrivRO sector, if it exists, is much smaller than that of the FOR sector. 
For the PrivRO, the superlatives are fewer but the losses are smaller, too.  
 
5. As it can be pointed out, the above conclusions doesn't offer enough indications for the 
evaluation of the FOR sector competitiveness in the manufacturing industry. 
 
Chapter III 
The analysis of the foreign capital competitiveness in manufacturing: 
                                      aggregated analysis of profits and losses  
 
We'll admit the definition of competititveness as the capability of producing and selling profitable. 
In this context, the profits analysis, the losses analysis and the profitability analysis –the subject of 
this chapter – are absolutely necessary for assessing competitiveness.  
 
In this section,  "the profitable sector" and "the unprofitable sector" denominate the set of all the 
firms that in 1998 made profits or,  respectively, registered losses. The separation of the profitable 
firms from the unprofitable ones is explained by the existence of major, systematic discrepancies 
between the two categories, discrepancies that, in most cases, cannot be explained by favorable or 
unfavorable economic circumstances and can not considered to be random. 
 
 III.1 Frequency of profitable companies, profitability  
 
In 1998, the frequency of profit-making firms was of approximately 68% for FOR compared to 
76% for PrivRO (for STATE, the percentage was of only 45%). The FOR sector accounts for 
maximal values in 7 divisions, while PrivRO in 14 divisions. Columns 6-9 in Table A4, Annex 2 
present the distribution of profitable firms at NACE divisions level. We enumerate below the 
divisions with statistically significant discrepancies, only (the number of firms in each analyzed 
category must be large enough).  
 
Without insisting upon these values, we will mention the divisions that witness major discrepancies 
between the three ownership types (discrepancies will be marked with "!"). The divisions with an 
important variability of profits frequency are the following (the codification of the divisions is made 
explicit in Table A1, Annex 2): Div 15 (the percentages of profit-making firms are 36%!, 69% and 
58% for STATE, PrivRO and FOR respectively), Div 17 (27%!, 65%, 59%), Div 18 (33%!, 86%, 
76%), Div 19 (38%!, 72%, 79%), Div 24 (31%!, 74%, 75%), Div 27 (33%! For STATE and 71% 
for PrivRO), Div 28 (52%, 79%, 36%!), Div 36 (32%!, 70%, 71%).  
 
We shell describe the profitability by the ratio between the difference "profits minus losses" and the 
turnover (percentage expression; see Table A5, Annex 2). In 1998, the profitability of the Romanian 
manufacturing industry was negative: -1.29%. This means that the manufacturing industry 
contributed to the decreasing and not to the increasing of the national wealth. The main contribution 
to this counter-performance was made by the STATE sector, with a profitability of -7.85%, while 
the private sector (domestic and foreign) had a positive contribution. 
 
The NACE divisions in which the STATE firms made profits were only three: Div 16, Div 22 and 
Div 32. It is interesting to notice that in the three profitable divisions, the STATE sector had a better 
performance compared to that of the private capital, although exports registered low values. Thus, 
losses were small or absent (95-100% of the assets were in the profitable area) and the share of 
profits was significantly higher (see Table A5). Nevertheless, on the other hand, among the 
industries in which the STATE firms registered losses there are some considered to locate 
competitive advantages, such as the textile industry, the leather and footwear industry, the wood 
working industry and furniture. 
 
At industrial branch level, the profitability of FOR and PrivRO is very different. 
 - The divisions in which the profitability of the FOR sector is much higher to that of the PrivRO 
sector are the following: Div19, the leather and footwear industry (the profitability of FOR 
companies is 16.38% against 1.03% for the PrivRO companies); Div20, the wood working industry 
(6.73%, against the negative -0.66%); Div21, the cellulose, paper and cardboard industry (11.35%, 
against -0,87); Div25, rubber and plastics manufacturing industry (9,31% against 0,89); Div31, the 
electrical and optical equipment industry (17,58%, against 7,60%). 
- The divisions in which the profitability of the FOR sector is much lower than that of the PrivRO 
sectorur are the following: Div22, publishing houses, polygraphs and type copying (the profitability 
of the FOR firms is 3.23% against 8.16% for the PrivRO firms); Div24, the chemical and synthetic 
and artificial fibres industry (1.80% against 9.75%); Div 26, industry of other products made of 
non-metallic minerals (1.39% against de 11.26%); Div 28, the metal structures and metal products 
industry, except machines, equipment, installations (-53.40% again 5.24%); Div29, the machine and 
equipment building industry (-3.09% against de 4.24%); Div35, the industry of other transport 
vehicles (-35.73% against 13.10%); Div36, furniture and other non-classified activities (-3.79% 
against 2.54%). 
- The divisions in which both FOR and  PrivRO sectors register  some of the highest profitabilities: 
Div18, ready-made clothes of textiles, furs and leather  (12.81% and 14.60%, against de -7.91% for 
STAT). 
 
III.2 The location and size of the profitable sector  
 
The dimension of the profitable sector can be described by three indices. The first one, already used 
in §III.1, is the frequency of profitable firms. This one presents the disadvantage of equally treating 
every two firms, irrespective of their dimensions. 
 
The second index is the share of the profitable capital (SPA), defined by the share of the value of 
fixed assets of the profitable sector, in the total of fixed assets value (the share will be expressed as 
a percent). A third index will be used, as well, the share of the profitable turnover (SPT)-similarly 
defined, with reference to the share of the turnover. More precisely, the definitions of the indices 
are the following: 
 
              SPA =100 X FAprof / FAtot           SPT=100 X Tprof / Ttot 
where:  
              FA= aggregate capital, expressed by the aggregate value of fixed assets in the reference set 
(the manufacturing industry or a NACE division); 
               T= aggregate turnover in the reference set. 
               'prof ' and 'tot ' indicate the aggregation sets: the profitable firms of the considered set and 
all the firms of the considered set, respectively. 
 
At the level of manufacturing, the share of the profitable capital is SPA=49%. In this way, the share 
of the  "captive" assets in the unprofitable sector is of 51%. That is  – in more vague but suggestive 
terms – half of the Romanian manufacturing was losing in 1998. The turnover of the profitable 
sector was of approximately 2/3 of the aggregate turnover of manufacturing.  
 
The decreasing order of the share of the profitable sector within each ownership type is the 
following (see Table A3 in Annex 2): PrivRO (70% of the capital and 82% of the turnover are 
concentrated in the profitable sector), FOR (62% of the capital and 78% of the turnover located in 
the profitable sector) and STATE (with only 36% of the capital and 44% of the turnover to be found 
in the profitable sector). 
 
Irrespective of the ownership type, the profitable sector accounts for large shares in Div16 
(accounting for 100% of the capital), Div32 (93% of the capital), Div18 and Div22 (85% of the 
capital), Div31 and Div26 (with 78% and 74% respectively of the capital). 
 
At division level, the share of the profitable sector generally presents a higher variability with 
regard to the ownership type. The divisions with a relative homogeneous behavior according to this 
criterion are just a few: Div16, Div22, and Div32, exactly those with the lowest share of the 
unprofitable sector.  
 
The shares of the profitable sectors are described in the following table. 
 
Table III.1 The distribution of the profit-making and loss-making sectors, 




Divisions locating  a 
high share of loss-
making sector 1) 
Polarized divisions 1) 2) Divisions locating  a high 
share of profit-making 
sector 1)  
STATE Div17, Div18, Div23, 
Div24, Div25, Div27,  
Div33 (>64%) 
Div15, Div19, Div20, Div26, 
Div28, Div29, Div31, Div34, 
Div35, Div36   
Div16, Div22, Div32 (>95%);
Div21 ( 61%) 
PrivRO Div21 (79%) Div17, Div19, Div20, Div24, 
Div25, Div27, Div36 
Div18, Div23, Div26, Div29, 
Div31, Div32, Div33, Div35 
(>80%); 
Div22 (78%); Div34(74%); 
Div28(68%); Div37(62%) 
FOR Div27, Div28 (>75%); 
Div29 (74%) 
Div25 Div16, Div18, Div19, Div21, 
Div32, Div34, Div36, Div37 
(>80%); 
Div15, Div26 (73%); 





as a whole  
Div23, Div27(85%) Div17, Div19, Div20, Div21, 
Div24, Div25, Div28, Div29, 
Div33, Div34, Div35, Div36, 
Div37 




0) The table summarizes information for the manufacturing industry 1998, from the Table A3(see 
the columns 6-9), Annex 2. 
1) Classification criterion is the capital share of the division, defined by the percent of the fixed 
assets value of profitable firms, computed in the total value of the fixed assets. All divisions were 
considered, irrespective theirs (small) number of firms.  
2) A division is defined as "polarized" if profit-making and loss-making sectors have near shares (in 
the interval 40-60%). 
 
III.3 The profit, the losses and the average size of the capital  
 
It should be noticed that the analysis of the frequency of profitable firms from §III.1 and the 
analysis summarized in Table III.1 are not equivalent: the conceptual difference consists in the fact 
that the first refers to the firm level, while the second to the aggregate level. Therefore, the 
frequency of the profitable firms and the share of the profitable capital are only partially consistent, 
although they register a high empirical correlation coefficient at division level: 0.84. Moreover, 
taking into account the two variables, the capital rate, RK, will be defined (see Table A4).   
 
The index RK will be computed for each division (and for the manufacturing industry as a whole, as 
well) and for each of the three ownership types, STATE, PrivRO and FOR (but also irrespective of 
the ownership type) as it follows: 
 
RK = (FAloss/FAprof)/(NRloss/NRprof) = (FAloss/NRloss)/(FAprof/NRprof) 
where: 
            FA = aggregate capital, expressed by the aggregate value of fixed assets; 
            NR = number of firms 
            'prof' and 'loss' indicate the aggregation set: profitable firms, unprofitable firms, 
respectively. 
 
In this context, FA/NR is the mean value of the capital and it describes in fact the average size of 
the firm, while RK compares the average sizes, more exactly it describes the ratio between the mean 
calculated for the loss-making firms and the mean for the profit-making firms.  
 
If the rate value is significantly higher than one, RK>1, then the average size of the loss-making 
firms is higher than that of the profit-making firms. (for example, RK=2 means that, in a specified 
set of firms, the mean capital of the loss-making firms is twice as big as the mean value the profit-
making firms). Otherwise, if  RK<1, then the average size of the loss-making firm is lower than that 
of the profit-making firms. A value of RK that doesn't significantly differ from 1 (is approximately 
1) should be interpreted as it follows: the hypothesis of equality of the mean capital of the profitable 
and unprofitable firms is accepted. The term "significantly" should be understood under the 
meaning of the theory of testing the statistical hypothesis. We draw the attention that in the absence 
of a correctly substantiated statistical analysis, the values of RK should be considered in the 
following empiric, "weaker" manner: if RK<1, then the bigger firms have a greater probability (but 
we don't know how much greater) of being profitable and, opposite, if RK>1 then it is "more 
probable" that the small firms should be profitable. 
 
At the manufacturing industry level (see the first line of Table A4), it can be noticed that for all the 
three ownership types, the relatively small firms present a greater probability to be profitable. This 
is also the case for some divisions: Div25, Div27, Div28, Div34 and Div35. Opposite, in the 
divisions Div15, Div18 and Div32 the bigger firms have a higher probability to be profitable and 
this is true for all the three ownership-types. 
 
The above suggests us the following conjecture: "the RK values can offer valuable information to 
underlie the restructuring policies". (Example: an increment of the size of the small firms in Div15, 
Div18 and Div32, could increase the probability to be profitable.) But we must stress that this 
conjecture will remain an hypothesis only, until a more stringent analysis will be carried on; it is 
obvious that the influx of capital cannot automatically make the firm profitable. 
 
We present below a synoptic table of the divisions in which the value of RK is significantly 
different from 1. We mention the fact that some "very high" values of RK –see Table A4– couldn't 
be taken into account because they were not statistically significant, mainly due to the small number 
of firms.                           
 
Table III.2 Profitability description 0), depending on the capital ratio RK 1), 




Divisions  with RK>1 2) Divisions with RK<1 3) 
STATE Div26, Div27, Div34 Div15 
PrivRO Div17, Div19, Div20, Div21, Div24, 
Div28, Div34, Div36 
Div15, Div18, Div32 
FOR Div28  Div15, Div18 
The manufacturing 
industry, as a whole 
Div17, Div19, Div20, Div24, Div27, 
Div28, Div29, Div34, Div35, Div36 
Div15, Div18, Div22, Div32 
0) The table summarizes information for the manufacturing industry 1998, from Table A4, Annex 2. 
1) See above the definition of the index RK. 
2) If RK>1 then the mean capital of the loss-making firms is significantly higher than the mean 
capital of profit-making firms. 
3) If RK<1 then the mean capital of the loss-making firms is significantly less than the mean capital 
of profit-making firms. 
 
III.4 The link between profits, losses and the capital productivity 
 
Similar to defining the capital rate, we define RKPR, the capital productivity rate as the ratio 
between the productivity of the profitable capital and the productivity of the unprofitable capital. 
This index can be calculated as functions of SPT and SPA (see Table A3). RKPR is defined as it 
follows: 
 
RKPR = (Tloss/Tprof)/(FAloss/FAprof) = (Tloss/FAloss)/(Tprof/FAprof) 
where: 
         FA = aggregate capital, defined by the aggregate value of the fixed assets;    
         T = aggregate turnover; 
         'prof' and 'loss' indicate the set for which the aggregation is made: profitable firms, 
unprofitable firms, respectively. 
         T/FA is the capital productivity. 
 
All the above mentioned considerations for RK are also valid for RKPR. The examination of RKPR 
values allows us to make a few remarks. 
1. RKPR values are generally less than one, meaning that the capital productivity is higher for the 
profitable companies. This is a predictable result. 
2. There are also six exceptions more difficult to interpret (two for each ownership type): situations 
in which the capital productivity is not higher for the profitable firms. The case of Div18 should be 
mentioned, because is statistically significant: RKPR is 1.08 for FOR and 0.47 for domestic 
companies. The interpretation of these values is the following: the profitability and the capital 
productivity are independent variables (!) for the FOR companies (CPR = 1.08 doesn't significantly 
differ from 1), while for the domestic companies (STATE or PrivRO), they are dependent: the 
profitability is accompanied by a higher capital productivity. The other five exceptions are not 
statistically significant because of the small number of firms in the respective sectors. They should 
be interpreted on a case-by-case basis, which is not our objective. 
3. Generally, the largest difference in capital productivity between the profitable and unprofitable 
firms appears in the FOR sector. Thus, at the level of the manufacturing industry, RKPR has the 
value of 0.46 for FOR, 0.51 for PrivRO and 0.72 for STATE. Also, the FOR sector locates the 
lowest values of RKPR at division level: 0,19 in Div 17; 0,08 in Div 28. These values indicate a 
high sub-utilization of the capital in the unprofitable area of the foreign sector. (Example: for 
Div28, the metal structures, metal products industry, except machines, equipment, installations, the 
capital aggregate productivity in the losing sector represents only 8% of the capital aggregate 
productivity in the profitable sector!)  
 
III.5 The share of the profit and losses in the turnover  
 
The analysis of profitability in §III.1 could be detailed, obtaining interesting general conclusions, 
but not information concerning the level of the profit in the profitable firms and the level of losses in 
the unprofitable ones. That's why we carried on a separate analysis for the profitable and 
unprofitable sectors (see columns 2-9 in Table A5). 
 
This approach starts from the observation that a discussion about competitiveness could be relevant 
only if, prior to it, the structurally noncompetitive firms (frequent enough) would be isolated. By 
structurally noncompetitive firms we understand one of the following two categories: 1) firms 
whose strategic mission is not the production and a profits transparently mention in the 
accountancy; 2) firms with negative or low profitability (as against the division they belong to), 
whose objective may be to make profits, but which can be viable on medium or long term only after 
a profound restructuring. It is, nevertheless, obvious that identifying structurally noncompetitive 
firm is a complex and also debatable problem which goes beyond the framework and possibilities of 
this study. The conjecture that we agree upon is the following: " the largest part of the structurally 
noncompetitive firms is to be found among the unprofitable firms". As a consequence, the analysis 
of competitiveness will be focused mainly on the analysis of the profitable firms sector. As a 
consequence, we shell focus the competitiveness analysis, mainly on the analysis of the profit-
making firms. Generally, this approach is not correct: the losses are not abnormal, they belong to 
the "rule of the game". The abnormal fact is the high frequency of the losses in the firms with at 
least 50 employees in Romanian '98 manufacturing: 33%. The conclusion is clear: as for the 
unprofitable firms sector, it cannot be ignored from the analysis due to its significant weight. 
 
Table III3. The appraisal of the profits and losses 0), 1) 
 by prevailing ownership and NACE division 
 
Loss-making sector: Profit-making sector:  
Prevailing 
ownership  
( profit 2)  / 
losses 3) ) 
High losses 
divisions  


















Div31, Div33, Div34 
Div27, Div32, 
Div37 












































Div28, Div32, Div34 








0) The table summarizes information for the manufacturing industry 1998, from the Table A5, 
Annex 2 (see the columns 2-9). 
1) The firms that report in the year 1998 profit, respectively losses were separately considered. 
2) 100% = the aggregate turnover of the profit-making firms in the specified ownership category. 
3) 100% = the aggregate turnover of the loss-making firms with the specified ownership category. 
4) less than 3% from the aggregate turnover. 
 
 
Although Table III.3 offers the opportunity for many comments, we just wish to draw the attention 
to three divisions with very contradictory results: some of the highest losses in the unprofitable 
sector and some of the highest profits in the profitable sector. These divisions are the following: 
Div18 for the PrivRO sector; Div20, Div24 for the FOR sector; Div28 for the FOR sector but for 
the division as a whole, as well. 
 
III.6 Profits, losses and exports in the manufacturing industry 
 
In §II.2 two conclusions were formulated: 1) at firm level, the frequency and intensity of export 
activities are maximum for the FOR firms; 2) at aggregate level, the maximum share of exports is to 
be found in the STATE sector. Table A6 in Annex 2 makes obvious the second conclusions but, 
moreover, allows to formulate a few useful observations concerning the analysis of the 
competitiveness or lack of competitiveness of the Romanian manufacturing industry. At the level of 
the manufacturing industry as a whole, the share of exports in the turnover is significantly higher 
for the firms with losses (32.25% in the unprofitable sector against 22.89% in the profitable sector). 
This situation is due to the STATE and FOR sectors where the share of exports is higher for the 
unprofitable firms (see the first line of Table A6). Nevertheless it must be mentioned that for 
PrivRO the situation is different: the share of exports is about 23%, both in profitable and 
unprofitable sector. Interesting for the profitable sector is the share of aggregate exports in the 
aggregate turnover is the same, irrespective the ownership type. 
 
The below synoptic table summarizes information from the Table A6. 
 
Table III4. The appraisal of the exports 0), 




Exports share in 
turnover 
Loss-making sector: 
High exports share divisions  
 (more than 40% from turnover)  
Profit-making sector: 
High exports share divisions 


























industry, as a whole/ 
 26% 
Div18(78%); 
Div19, Div35, Div36(50%-60%); 
Div17, Div20, Div29(40%-50%) 
Div18(78%), Div36(60%); 
Div17, Div19, Div20, 
Div27(40%-50%) 
0) The table summarizes information for the manufacturing industry, year 1998, from the Table A6, 
Annex 2. All divisions were considered, irrespective theirs small number of firms.  
 
 
A comparison of the profitable and unprofitable sectors (by taking into account the share of exports 
in the turnover) leads to some interesting conclusions for FOR (see Table A6): 
a) At division level, with five exceptions, statistically non-significant, the share of exports is higher 
in the unprofitable sector than in the profitable one. 
b) In the unprofitable sector, the exports register important shares (over 88%) in Div17, Div18, 
Div19, Div35 and Div36. 
c) In the profitable sector, the exports have very large shares exclusively in Div18 (84.21%) and 
Div27 (94.29%, but in this case there is only one firm). 
 
In conclusion, a characteristic of the unprofitable sector of FOR is a higher level of exports. This is 
true at the aggregate level of some divisions, namely some divisions which are representative for 
Romanian exports, but also at the aggregate level of the manufacturing industry, as a whole.  
 
Through an attentive analysis of Table A6, we'll try to evaluate what is behind this conclusion. Five 
remarks will be on interest. 
r1. For the unprofitable part of the FOR sector, the largest share of exports (over 50% of the 
aggregate turnover of the division) is located in eight divisions (see column 5, Table A6). These 
divisions are the following: Div 17 (88.60%), Div 18 (93.38%), Div 19 (92.78%), Div 20 (61.39%), 
Div 27 (50.66%), Div 29 (66.09%), Div 35 (94.66), Div 36 (89,12%).     
r2. For all companies (profitable or not, irrespective of the ownership type) it can be noticed that 
the divisions mentioned at r1 are exactly the ones with the largest aggregate shares of the exports. 
The values are the following: (see column 10, Table A6): Div 17 (40.78%), Div 18 (77.65%), Div 
19 (48.77%), Div 20 (44.05%), Div 27 (39.39%), Div 29 (31.34%), Div 35 (41.88%), Div 36 
(58.36%). 
r3. For the profitable sector (irrespective of the ownership type), the same divisions mentioned at 
r1 register the largest aggregate shares of exports, with one exception –Div 29 with a share above 
the average but relatively lower. The values are the following: Div 17 (40.97%), Div 18 (77.60%), 
Div 19 (45.74%), Div 20 (43.90%), Div 27 (43.82%), Div 29 (26.56%), Div 35 (34.51%), Div 36 
(59.86%). 
r4. The aggregate values of approximately 50% or more of the exports share in the aggregate 
turnover are located as it follows: 
   3 for the profitable sector of the STATE – Div 18(75,99%), Div 27(46,53%), Div 36(49,98%); 
   4 for the profitable sector of PrivRO – Div 18(74,42%), Div 19(52,45%), Div 20(50,57%), Div 
36(63,28%); 
   4 for the profitable sector of FOR– Div 17(57,18%), Div 18(84,21%), Div 27(94,29%), Div 
29(54,68%); 
   3 for the unprofitable sector of STATE – Div 19(48,87%), Div 35(54,17%), Div 36(47,73%); 
   5 for the unprofitable sector of  PrivRO – Div 18(63,93%), Div 19(50,95%), Div 26(46,48%), Div 
28(46,83%), Div 36(56,60%); 
   8 for the unprofitable sector of FOR – the divisions above mentioned at r1. 
It can be noticed that, from this point of view, the unprofitable sector of FOR register the best 
performance in terms of exports: the most numerous divisions and the highest values (5 from these 
values are over 88%). 
r5. The divisions mentioned at r1 are among the industries that have traditionally located 
comparative advantages.  
 
The fact that (according to r1 and r3) the largest shares of exports are located in the same divisions 
both for unprofitable FOR sector, but also for all profitable firms, irrespective the ownership type, 
shows that not the international markets are responsible for the losses. Moreover, taking into 
account r5, the domestic conditions required by the production process are generally met. r4 singles 
out the situation of the unprofitable sector of FOR. In this context, the inefficiency of a large part of 
the FOR firms seems to be related to causes mainly related to the characteristics of the firm. Two 
possible explanations of this situation could be: 1) the management and marketing activities are 
poor; 2) obtaining profit is not the main motivation of the export activities (the motivation should 
be, for instance, related to the strategies of the parent-companies, including also the practicing of 
transfer prices). 
 
The possible formulation "losses are associated with large shares of exports", formulation that 
might be suggested by the examination of the first line of Table A6 is misleading. The correct result 
is the following:  
 
R1. A characteristic of the unprofitable sector of FOR and STATE (but not PrivRO) is the high 
share of aggregated exports. This is true at the aggregate level of the manufacturing industry but 
also at the aggregate level of some divisions, namely some divisions which are representative for 
Romanian exports.  
 
Moreover, the table below is pointing out a rather different aspect. 
 
Table III5. The firms frequency 0) , 
by profits/losses, ownership type and exports level 
100%= all the firms of the category (of the line) 
Exports level 
 (% from the turnover) 
Prevailing 
ownership,  
Profits/Losses [0, 5) [5, 25) [25, 50) [50, 75) [75, 100] 
STATE,  Profit 55.7 1) 16.4 13.9 9 5 
STATE,  Losses 59.6 15.7 12.4 9.4 2.8 
PrivRO,  Profit 53.8 10.9 7.2 8 20.1 
PrivRO,  Losses 61.9 9.3 8.3 7.3 13.2 
FOR,       Profit 31.8 6.1 3.8 6.9 51.3 
FOR,       Losses 39.3 4.9 6.6 8.2 41 
0) The table summarizes information for the manufacturing industry, firms having at 
least 50 employees, year 1998.  
1) Meaning, example: 55.7% from profit-making STATE firms have the share of the 
exports in turnover between 0% and 5%. 
 
Comment 
a) The Table III.5 reveals the statement R2, which follows): 
R2. Significant differences appear between the frequencies of loss-making and profit-making firms, 
for two levels of exports: un-exporters and high exporters. In fact, the frequency and the intensity of 
export activities are higher for profit-making firms comparing to loss-making firms, for each of the 
three ownership types.  Moreover, a high level of exports is associated with a smaller frequency of 
losses, irrespective of the ownership types (for the last statement, see Boscaiu and other, 2000, 
Table 20, Annex). 
b) The statements R1 and R2 seem to be contradictory, but they are not. Their explanation can be 
found in the non-homogeneity of the turnover of loss-making and profit-making firms, both for 
STATE and FOR sector. (In STATE sector, the highest weight of turnover is located in the category 
of loss-making firms exporting 25%-50% and the firms of this category have the highest average 
turnover. As it concerns FOR sector, the highest weight of turnover is located in the category of 
profit-making firms exporting not more than 5%. The turnover in this category also has high 
average, comparing with loss-making firms of the same exports level.) 
 
Conclusions concerning the dependence between exports, profits and losses 
1) The frequency of the exporting firms is higher for profit-making firms, comparing with loss-
making firms, irrespective the ownership type. 
2) The exports decrease the loss frequency, irrespective the ownership type. 
3) For the FOR and STATE firms (but not for PrivRO) the aggregated value of exports is higher in 
the loss-making sector, comparing with profit-making sector. 
4) The unprofitable FOR firms register the highest exports in the divisions generating the highest 
exports of the manufacturing. Moreover, the profitable FOR sector exports massively, as well, 
in the same divisions. This means that not the export activities as such are associated with 
losses. The causes of losses must be looked for in the managerial characteristics of firms. 
 
III.7 Investments, profits and losses in manufacturing 
 
Table A7 shows a few interesting aspects concerning the investment intensity, intensity described by 
the ratio between the value of investments and the value of the turnover, ratio computed for various 
aggregation levels. The first line of the table concerns manufacturing as a whole. At this level, two 
conclusions can be drawn. 
1) The decreasing order of the investment intensity is the following: FOR, PrivRO, STATE; this 
order is observed for the profitable sector (the set of profit-making firms) and the unprofitable 
sector (loss-making firms) as well. 
2) The investment intensity registers a higher value in the profitable sector (11,45% against 8,41% 
in the unprofitable sector). The above statement is misleading, however: it is explained exclusively 
by the high share of investments in the profitable sector of FOR (30,18%).  
 
The two above conclusions are not always true at division level, as well. A special case can be 
mentioned: the investment intensity of the unprofitable firms is significantly higher than that of the 
profitable firms. The divisions where we found such situations are the following: Div17, Div18, 
Div20, Div24 (for each of the three ownership types), and Div33, Div36 (for PrivRO and FOR). It 
should be noticed the high level of exports in 5 of these divisions (the exception is Div33). It seems 
that the main source of losses in these divisions is not the lack of performance. Even if identifying 
the causes of losses doesn't make the subject of this paper, we mention a few possible ones: the 
long-term development policies of the companies, the practice of transfer prices, various accounting 
manipulations with fiscal motivations, etc. 
 
III.8 The share of materials, the profits and losses 
 
Table A8 in Annex 2 shows a few aspects related to the share of materials in the turnover 
(materials: the value of the raw materials and consumption materials –including power, water and 
other material expenses). The first line of the table refers to manufacturing, as a whole. At this 
level, beyond the natural remark that the share of materials mainly depends –from technological 
reasons– on the division, three conclusions can be drawn. 
1) The increasing order of the share of the materials in the turnover is the following: FOR, PrivRO, 
STATE; this order is observed both in the profitable and unprofitable sector. 
2) The share of the materials register higher values for the unprofitable sector, for each of the three 
types of ownership: (72%, 64% and 55% in the unprofitable sectors of STATE, PrivRO şi FOR, 
against 60%, 52% and 47% respectively, in the profitable sector). 
3) Generally, the first two conclusions also hold at division level, as well, with two exceptions.  
 
Chapter IV 
The comparative analysis of the performance by ownership type in the manufacturing 
industry: allocation diversity ratios and aggregate ratios 
 
IV.1 The allocation diversity ratios, AD and the aggregate ratios, RA  
 
The comparative analysis is carried on for the manufacturing industry as a whole, making use of 
two types of indices: aggregate ratio, RA (Boscaiu and others, 2000) and allocation diversity ratio, 
AD (Rojec, 2000). Details concerning the definitions of these ratios can be found in Annex A1. The 
indices for which RA and AD are calculated are to be found in Rojec's study (2000). 
 
The aggregate ratio of the variables X and Y for the ownership type OT is defined as it follows (the 
use of the brackets could be avoided but we intend to confer an intuitive character to the definition): 
RATP[X:Y] = (XOT/X)/(YOT/Y) = (XOT/YOT) / (X/Y), 
 
where X (respectively XOT) is the sum of the values of the variable X for all the companies in the 
manufacturing industry (respectively for the companies of the OT category); Y and  YOT are 
similarly defined for Y variable. 
 
The allocation diversity ratio attached to the X/Y ratio, defined for the ownership type OT is the 













OT Y]:[X AD  
where: i = individual manufacturing industry according to the NACE classification, i = 1,..,23; 
            OT = the selected ownership type; 
 pi = xi / yi  is the value of the index X/Y in the division "i" for the ownership type OT; 
       P = X/Y is the value of the index X/Y for the manufacturing industry as a whole; 
             xi  (yi , respectively) = is the sum of the values of variable X (Y respectively) in the  
             division "i", for the ownership type OT; 
             X (Y, respectively) = the sum of the values of variable X (Y, respectively) for the 
manufacturing industry as a whole; 
            ai = total value of assets in division "i" for OT; 
            A = total value of assets in the manufacturing industry for OT 
 
Unlike RA, which is an actual index, AD is a virtual index. It describes the potential of a certain 
category of companies in relation to a weight variable. In our case the weight variable is the value 
of fixed assets. This gives the AD analysis the character of a resources allocation efficiency 
analysis. In this situation, a level of over 100% of AD reflects the tendency of the respective 
category of companies to locate their assets in activities in which the index X/Y register high 
values. For the Romanian manufacturing industry, the virtual character of AD is emphasized, given 
the different degree of sub-utilization of the fixed assets. The decreasing order of degree of 
utilization of the fixed assets was in 1998: FOR, PrivRO, STATE (Boscaiu and others, 2000). 
We stress the fact that the interpretation of the AD  values, computed for each ownership type must 
be related to the AD values computed at the aggregate level of  manufacturing (as against RA, the 
value of AD for manufacturing as a whole is not 100%). 
If  variable Y from the definition of the index  P=X/Y is the value of the fixed assets then AD and 
RA ratios are identical.  
 
We present below a table with five performance/operation  indices, calculated for four ownership 
types: besides the already mentioned types (STATE, PrivRO and FOR), we also define the ROM 
sector of the companies predominantly domestic-owned (STATE or PrivRO). There are two reasons 
for this suplimentary definition: on one hand, in order to compare the conclusions for the binary 
structure ROM/FOR with the conclusions for the ternary structure STATE/PrivRO/FOR and, on the 
other hand (although it is not the aim of the present paper), in order to ensure the comparability of 
the results of this subchapter with those of similar analysis for the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Slovakia and Slovenia (Rojec, 2000).                         
 
Table IV.1 Aggregate ratios and allocation diversity ratios in the manufacturing 
industry, by ownership type 0) 
Aggregate ratio 1)        
RA (%) 












ROM FOR Total 
2) 
Profit / equity 3) 28 232 86 218 29 243 93 295 110
Losses / equity 3) 110 70 99 113 108 74 98 119 100
Labor productivity 4) 92 98 95 146 104 114 110 215 118
Exports /Turnover 111 89 101 94 114 97 106 115 107
Fixed assets / Employees number  133 64 99 109 164 82 132 213 133
0) The table summarizes information for the manufacturing industry, firms having at least 50 
employees, year 1998.  
1) 100%= actual value of the ratio for manufacturing industry and specified ownership type; 
2) The AD value is a virtual one, depending on the weight variable (here, the fixed assets value). 
An AD ratio for a specified ownership type must be compared to the "Total" value, which is 
referring to the manufacturing industry, as a whole. 
3) These indices are referring to the two complementary firms sets: profitable and unprofitable, 
respectively. 
4) Productivity = value added/number of employees. 
 
The analysis of the above table allows us some general comments. 
 a) The minimum values of the indices (in the table they are written italic) are identically positioned 
by the criteria RA and AD; 
 b) As far as the maximum values are concerned (in the table they are written bold), the consistency 
of RA and AD indications is relative; 
 c) The values of RA and AD point out major discrepancies between the STATE sector and the 
PrivRO sector. Under these conditions, the simple comparison between the FOR companies and the 




AD reveals that the FOR companies tend (remind that AD is a virtual index) to locate in highly 
performance industries more than the STATE or PrivRO firms. In other words, for all considered 
indices, the maximum values of AD are to be found in the FOR sector. Nevertheless, we would 
point out that the index concerning the share of losses is also the highest in the case of FOR, with a 
negative connotation this time (remind that the index refers only to the companies with losses). 
From the point of view of the actual situation described by RA, things look differently: the highest 
values of the indices are distributed between the STATE, PrivRO and FOR companies. 
 
The analysis of profits and losses was approached separately. Unlike Rojec, we haven't analyzed the 
profitability because of negative and close to zero values of the difference between profits minus 
losses, values which would have made unstable the estimates type RA and AD (values computed 
taking into account the difference "profits minus losses"). On the other hand, as it was mentioned 
before, the "mixing" of profits with losses means the wasting of information and the decrease the 
accuracy of the analysis. 
 
The share of profits in the equity capital is the lowest in the STATE sector: 7-8 times lower than in 
the PrivRO or FOR sectors. The share of losses in the equity capital is the lowest for the PrivRO 
firms: 60-70% of the values registered in the FOR or STATE sectors; the shares of losses in the 
equity capital don't differ significantly for the FOR and STATE sectors. We can mention the fact 
that as far as profits and losses are concerned the most well-balanced situation is that of the PrivRO 
sector  (it register minimum values of RA and DA ratios for losses and maximum and close to 
maximum values of RA and DA, respectively for profits).  
 
The analysis of labor productivity shows significantly higher values of RA and AD in the FOR 
sector, as compared to STATE and PrivRO. 
 
Examining the share of exports in turnover, RA and AD, as well, situates PrivRO companies on the 
last place. RA situates the STATE sector on the top, while AD doesn't identify a difference between 
FOR and STATE companies. 
 
Finally, as far as the capital endowment described by the value of fixed assets per employee is 
concerned, RA and AD, as well, situates the PrivRO companies again on the last place. RA places 





We are not going to reiterate all the conclusions previously formulated in the study. Practically, 
every subchapter of Chapters II and III has its own notable conclusions. Generally, in the present 
section, we concentrate on two topics: 1) emphasizing some methodological aspects – the majority 
of which has been discussed before; 2) some general conclusions which are relevant for the analysis 
of competitiveness. 
 
In addition, we suggest an evaluation of the Romanian manufacturing industry competitiveness at 
division level. This analysis was not carried on in the previous chapters but it is based on the indices 
presented in Tables A3, A4, A5, and A6 in Annex 2. These tables were used in Chapter III. Finally, 
some general considerations and suggestions for the continuation of the research will conclude our 
paper.  
 
V. 1 Methodological comments 
 
It should be stressed that not the exhaustive evaluation of the Romanian manufacturing industry 
competitiveness was the objective of this analysis. The objective of our analysis was the evaluation 
of the FOR sector competitiveness, that is of the prevailing foreign-owned companies 
competitiveness. Nevertheless, taking into account the major discrepancies within the domestic 
capital sector, we chose to separately evaluate the FOR sector competitiveness in comparison with 
the STATE sector, of the prevailing foreign-owned firms and with the PrivRO sector, of the 
prevailing Romanian capital private firms. 
 
Our approach was not the usual one to be followed in the studies concerning the quantitative 
analysis of competitiveness (to enter the general problems of the competitiveness analysis, the 
reader may see, for example, two interesting articles, accompanied by interesting references: Maria 
Teresa  S. Duenas-Caparas, (1999); Cockburn and others (1997)). 
 
The methodology of our analysis is based on the minimal understanding of "competitiveness": the 
capacity of producing and selling profitably, both on the domestic and international market. Given 
the very large share of losses in the manufacturing industry (approximately one third of the firms, 
which account for approximately half of the fixed assets), we chose to define and analyze 
individually two sectors: the profitable sector and the unprofitable sector. "Splitting" the set of the 
manufacturing firms into two sectors is an artificial but necessary task. The reason for it consists in 
the existence of major systematic discrepancies between the two categories, discrepancies that, in 
most cases, cannot be exclusively explained by random causes, related to economic circumstances 
or to the long-term development policies. 
 
The present analysis is static (our data refers exclusively to 1998). That's why we did not use any 
price index. Otherwise, given the fact that the central objective of the analysis was the comparison 
of parts (defined by the ownership type) of the same entities, involving price indices would have 
been unnecessary.        
 
The first question we asked ourselves when we projected this analysis was the following: is a data-
base for the end of 1998 able to offer valid conclusions for 2001? Generally, the answer should be 
affirmative but it requires to be discussed. An industrial branch competitiveness/non-
competitiveness couldn't qualitatively change in the period 1999-2000, a period rather characterized 
by stagnation. We must, nevertheless, stress that the privatization process at the level of some 
NACE divisions –a delayed process in 1998– has developed at a more or less constant pace in 
1999-2000. This means that, comparing to 1998, some firms changed their ownership form, passing 
from one category into another. Generally, the weight of the STATE sector diminished in favor of 
the private sector (Romanian or foreign). On a short term, the influence of this transfer of ownership 
on the competitiveness of some NACE divisions cannot be too important, but the weights of the 
three sectors defined according to the prevailing ownership type could change significantly. As a 
conclusion, the situation of the divisions with large weight of private sector (FOR or PrivRO) didn't 
suffer important modifications in 1999-2000. However, is possible that some divisions outside the 
Table V.1 (from below) "to have entered" into the Table V.1 after 1998, a fact that our study 
couldn't reveal. 
 
V.2. General conclusions       
 
G1. The most important contributions and shares of the FOR sector are to be found in the 
subsections presented in the table below. 
 
 
Table V.1 The NACE subsections of the manufacturing industry which locate the best  
contributions/weights of the prevailing foreign-owned companies, year 1998 0) ,1) 
 























(Total ) 2) 
9,5 14,4 13,4 23 12,9 24,2 8,9 7,8 
EA Food, beverage 
and tobacco  
17,7 26,4 7,9 32,9 21,8 35,3 24,0 11,3 
EB Textile and textile 
fabrics 
17 22,1 28,4 22,6 18,5 32,2 6,5 15,3 
EC Leather and 
footwear  
13,8 28,6 22,1 46,4 19,0 48,2 10,2 14,0 
ED Wood working 
industry (except 
furniture)  
7,9 13,5 21,8 30,1 8,1 16,4 10,8 6,6 
EE Cellulose, paper, 
cardboard and  
products  
6,4 12,5 21,7 12 11,8 10 3,7 6,1 
EG Chemical and 
synthetical and 
artificial fibers  
18 26 24,7 49,6 31,4 38,5 22,7 13,2 
EI Other products 
made of non-
metallic minerals  
19,9 11,7 13 36,9 11,9 6,7 16,0 10,0 
EM Electrical and 
optical equipment 
27 34,8 27,3 44,5 18,3 40,8 9,0 10,0 
EN Transport 
vehicles 
8,3 5,6 17,6 24,3 6,1 5,1 9,4 4,0 
0) The share of prevailing foreign-owned capital in the subsections of the table was in 1998 higher 
than 5%. 
1) The values represent the percentages got/realized by the prevailing foreign-owned companies, 
percentages calculated from the total of the respective parameter at subsection level. 
2)The manufacturing industry, as a whole, were introdused in the table to allow the comparisons. 
 
 
The FOR sector is not significant for the manufacturing subsections not enclosed in the Table V.1 
(because of their low share). The conclusions concerning the competitiveness of the subsections in 
Table V.1 will be explicitly formulated at the level of the corresponding NACE divisions. 
 
G2. Let get back to Dunning's conjecture according to which the economies in the first stage of 
development of their competitive advantages –that based on the production factor endowment– are 
likely to receive FDI inflows mainly in the sectors characterized by a low value-added, based on the 
low cost of the labor force or of the raw materials (see the first two stages, S1 and S2, described in 
Chapter I). Table V.1 shows that, in the case of Romania, FDI orientation is not predominantly the 
one characteristic to the first stage of development of the recipient economies, but to the second 
one. The textile industry, the leather and footwear industry, the food industry, the chemical industry 
are branches characteristic –according to Dunning's conjecture– to the FDI targets in the economies 
in the second stage of development. More than this, foreign capital has significant contributions 
even in more complex manufacturing activities, such as the electrical and optical equipment 
industry or the industry of transport vehicles.   
 
It is certain that the indications given by the FDI orientation are not enough to draw reliable 
conclusions concerning the stage of development of the competitive advantages in Romania. As we 
showed in Chapter I, the conclusion of the analysis concerning the foreign trade and the 
competitiveness of the Romanian economy carried on by Valentin Cojanu (Cojanu, 1997) was that 
this country was in the first stage of development. 
 
Otherwise, a recent study (Daianu and others, 2001) confirms, by virtue of the revealed comparative 
advantages analysis, that the Romanian economy has such clear advantages in the wood working 
industry (except furniture) as well as temporary comparative advantages in the textile industry and 
in the leather and footwear industry. Temporary because, in Daianu's opinion, it is expected that on 
a middle term, the too high costs of the labor force –caused not by too high salaries but by too low 
productivity– to compromise the respective comparative advantages. 
 
It should be a mistake to assert the idea that Romania is in the second stage of development of its 
competitive advantages (given the general state of the economy). Nevertheless, one could say that 
FDI anticipates the development process, giving important signs concerning its direction. 
   
G3. Foreign direct investments in Romania are mainly located in low value added activities (see the 
"value added/turnover" rate in Table A2 in Annex 2). At the same time, at firm level, the share of 
imported materials is the highest for the FOR companies. These are two of the explanations of the 
low macroeconomic impact of foreign capital on the restructuring processes in the Romanian 
economy. 
 
G4. In Romania's case there are some obvious competitive advantages of the FOR companies 
(comparing to the companies controlled by the domestic capital): their labor and capital 
productivity are higher, their frequency and dimension of export activities are higher, their 
investment effort is highly superior and their capacity of using subcontracting is superior.                
 
G5. The above superlatives don't lead – as expected – to a decrease of the share of the unprofitable 
firms within the FOR sector. There is a polarized structure of the foreign-controlled companies 
consisting in a group of performance firms and, on the other hand, in a consistent group of 
unprofitable firms. Indeed, 32% of the FOR companies are unprofitable, accounting for 38% of the 
total fixed assets of the foreign sector. The share of the losses of the unprofitable foreign-controlled 
companies is impressive: 23% of the total turnover (against 17-18% for the STATE and PrivRO 
companies). Compared to the FOR sector, the polarization of the PrivRO sector is smaller. The 
economic performance indices have got close but lower values than those of the FOR companies, 
but, on the other hand, the size of the losses in the PrivRO sector is significantly smaller (24% of 
the PrivRO firms are unprofitable, accounting for 30% of the total fixed assets).  
 
G6. The highest level of exports is registered by the loss-making FOR companies. The massive 
exports of the unprofitable firms are to be found in the industries in which the profitable FOR firms 
export a lot, as well. This means that the losses mustn't be attributed to the export activities, as such, 
but to other aspects which might be related, among other causes, to the strategies of the parent 
companies, including the using of transfer prices (see §III.6). 
 
G7. The conclusion G6 is supported by an analysis carried on at firm level (which hasn't been 
mentioned up to now). According to this analysis, the companies that exported more than 75% of 
their production and, besides, registered losses in 1998 are located, most of them, irrespective of 
their ownership type, in the subsections of Table V.1. More precisely, this category of firms is 
mainly to be found in the following subsections: in subsection EB (the textile industry and of textile 
fabrics, NACE divisions 17 and 18, especially the NACE group 182 –clothing and underwear made 
of textile fabrics); in subsection EC (the leather and footwear industry, NACE group 193 –
footwear); in subsection ED (the wood working industry, except furniture; and in subsection EK 
(metal structures, metal products industry, except machines, equipment, installations). This is 
surprising because the industries mentioned above host the largest exports (with the exception of 
EK) and the largest profits. 
 
G8.  At the level of the manufacturing industry as a whole (see the first line of Table A4), it has 
been found that for all the three types of prevailing ownership, the companies relatively small have 
a higher probability of being profitable. This result is valid for some divisions as well: Div25, 
Div27, Div28, Div34 and Div35. On the contrary, there are three divisions for which the large firms 
have a higher probability of being profitable for all the three types o prevailing ownership: Div15, 
Div18, Div32. (The key to the NACE divisions is presented in Table A1, Annex 2) 
 
G9.  The examination of the allocation diversity ratios has shown major discrepancies between the 
STATE, PrivRO and FOR sectors, but also internal discrepancies of the FOR sector, already 
mentioned at G5: 
          - the allocation of resources in the FOR sector is mainly made towards the industries with a 
strong profit-making sector but also in industries with high losses in the loss-making sector, in 
industries with high labor productivity, high exports and in industries with a high fixed assets 
endowment; 
          - the allocation of resources in the PrivRO sector is mainly made towards the industries with 
high profits, low losses, low labor productivity, low exports, industries with a low fixed assets 
endowment; 
    - the STATE resources are mainly allocated towards the branches with low profits and high 
losses, the lowest labor productivity, high exports but a high fixed assets endowment. 
 
As a conclusion, the present configuration of FDI inflows influences the competitiveness of the 
Romanian economy not only at the level of recipient companies but also at macroeconomic level by 
means of the resource allocation process. In other words, the FDI inflows also play a role, even if, 
according to the G3 conclusion, a small one, in the macroeconomic restructuring. 
 
V.3 Competitiveness, by the prevailing ownership type 
 
In order to evaluate competitiveness, a few of the indices previously mentioned were corroborated 
(that is: the weight of the profitable sector, the weight of the unprofitable sector, the size of profits 
in the profitable sector, the weight of exports in the profitable sector). The evaluation criteria that 
we suggest are described below (they can be, obviously, modified by the reader, who has, in Annex 
2, all the necessary information for his own analysis). 
 
The definition of the competitiveness criterion  
We classify a sector (a specified part of a well-defined firms set) in one of the following four 
categories: 
i) A sector of a set of firms is not-significant if it accounts for less than 5% of the fixed assets of the 
set of firms which it belongs to. 
ii) A sector of a set of firms is locally-competitive if it accounts for at least 5% of the fixed assets 
and if at least 50% of these assets belong to the profitable firms. (Or –expressed more suggestive 
even if less precisely– the sector has a significant weight and the majority of its assets are to be 
found in the profitable area.) 
iii) A sector of a set of firms is competitive if it is locally-competitive and, in addition, its profitable 
firms export at least 25% of the production. (Thus, "locally-competitive" means "competitive on 
local markets, exclusively", while the meaning of "competitive" is "competitive on national and 
international markets".) 
iv) A sector of a set of firms is not-competitive if it has a significant share but it is not locally 
competitive (or, in other words, it accounts for more than 5% of the fixed assets of the set but less 
than 50% of these assets belong to the profitable firms). 
 
The above classification scheme is defined according to the principle "the majority decides" (or, 
using a well-known saying "the winner takes it all"): if the unprofitable firms are in majority (by the 
aggregated share of the fixed assets), then the sector is qualified as not competitive, and, on the 
contrary, if the profitable firms are in majority, than the sector is qualified as (locally-)competitive. 
A separate analysis of the profitable and unprofitable firms has been necessary for the accuracy of 
the respective analysis. Reducing the accuracy of the analysis might not be important for an 
economy with small losses but can be very important for an economy with high losses. Or, this is 
the situation of the 1998 Romania: 1) half of the capital of the manufacturing industry was caught in 
unprofitable activities; 2) in most cases, the discrepancies between the profitable and the 
unprofitable sector of the same set of firms (set identified by division and the prevailing ownership 
type) cannot be explained by accidental events or more or less favorable economic circumstances.  
 
C1. According to these criteria, the FOR sector, the sector of the manufacturing firms with 
prevailing foreign capital, is locally-competitive.  (Indeed, 68% of the firms are profitable and 
account for 62% of the total fixed assets of FOR; the profitable firms account for 78% of the FOR 
turnover; for the profitable sector of FOR, the profits, exports and investments represent 9.98%, 
21.51% and 30.18% of the turnover).  
      
The STATE sector of the manufacturing industry is not-competitive. (Indeed, only 45% of the firms 
are profitable and account for 48% of the total STATE fixed assets; the profitable firms account for 
44% of the STATE turnover; for the profitable part of the STATE sector, the profits, exports and 
investments represent 4.56%, 23.33% and 5.14% respectively of the turnover). 
 
The PrivRO sector of the manufacturing industry is locally-competitive. (Indeed, 76% of the firms 
are profitable and account for 70% of the total fixed assets of PrivRO; the profitable firms account 
for 82% of the PrivRO turnover; for the profitable part of the PrivRO sector, the profits, exports and 
investments represent 9.83%, 23.11% and 8.30% respectively of the turnover). 
 
The conclusion is clear: the STATE sector is not-competitive. The PrivRO and FOR sectors are 
locally-competitive and their competitiveness doesn't differ significantly.     
 
C2. We'll detail at division level the analysis of the competitiveness in FOR sector, the sector of the 
firms with prevailing foreign capital. (The key to the NACE divisions is presented in Table A1, 
Annex 2).  
-At the level of 1998, the FOR sector is not-significant in the following divisions: Div23, Div25, 
Div27, Div28, Div29, Div30, Div33, Div35, Div37. These divisions were analyzed in Chapter III, 
but given their low weight, we cannot discuss the problem of the FOR sector competitiveness.  
-The FOR sector is  locally-competitive in: 
a) Div15, Div16, Div21, Div22, Div26, Div32. These divisions are characterized by a large share of 
the profitable firms in the FOR sector, low or moderate profit, non-significant exports. We mention 
that for each of the above divisions, the maximum share of the profits is to be found in the STATE 
or PrivRO sector, but not in the FOR one. 
b) Div31. The share of the profitable firms is of 66%, the profits attaining some of the highest 
values (approximately 22% in the turnover), the level of exports is moderate, much inferior to the 
STATE and PrivRO sectors. 
-The FOR sector is competitive in the following divisions: 
a) Div17, Div18, Div19, Div20, Div24. The share of the FOR profitable sector is high (84-85%) in 
Div18 and Div19 and moderate (61-65%) in Div17, Div20, Div24; the profit register values over 
the average level for the division (some of the highest values –between 17% and 20%– in Div18, 
Div19, Div20); the share of exports is high both in the profitable area and in the unprofitable one 
(the maximum value: 85% in Div18). 
b) Div34, Div36. The share of the profitable firms in the FOR sector is close to 100% but the profits 
register moderate values, much inferior to those of the PrivRO sector; the level of exports is high 
(30%, 50%, respectively). 
 
C3. Using the same methodology, we'll evaluate the competitiveness of the PrivRO sector, that of 
the firms with prevailing domestic private capital. 
-The PrivRO sector is not significant in Div16, Div30. 
-The PrivRO sector is not competitive in Div21, Div36. The situation of the domestic private sector 
in Div36 (mainly of furniture) is remarkable: the exports represent almost 60% of the turnover, the 
profit is of 10%, over the average, but the share of the profitable firms of the PrivRO sector is of 
48%. 
- The PrivRO sector is locally-competitive in: Div15, Div22, Div23, Div24, Div25, Div27, Div28, 
Div29, Div32, Div33, Div34, Div35. 
-  The PrivRO sector is competitive in: Div17, Div18, Div19, Div20, Div26, Div31, Div37.          
 
C4. Similarly, we'll asses the competitiveness of the STATE sector, the sector of the prevailing 
domestic state capita. 
-The STATE sector is not-significant in Div37. 
-The STATE sector is not competitive in Div15, Div17, Div18, Div19, Div23, Div24, Div25, 
Div26, Div27, Div28, Div30, Div33, Div34, Div36. The situation of the STATE sector from Div18 
(the ready-made clothes industry) is remarkable in a negative sense: exports represent 
approximately 58% of the turnover, the share of the profitable firms of the STATE sector is of only 
35% and the profit is of only 1.82%, while for the profitable sector of PrivRO and FOR the profit is 
of approximately 17%. 
- The STATE sector is locally-competitive in: Div16, Div20, Div21, Div22, Div31, Div32. 
- The STATE sector is competitive in: Div29, Div35.  
 
C5. At this point, we'll evaluate the competitiveness of the manufacturing industry as a whole. The 
same methodology will be used, except for the condition i), which is no more necessary. 
- The manufacturing industry is not competitive in Div17, Div21, Div23, Div24, Div27, Div28, 
Div30, Div33, Div36. A part of the divisions included in the above list have a common, noticeable 
characteristic: high shares of exports and, at the same time, high shares (over 50%) of the 
unprofitable firms. Indeed: Div17 (the textile industry and of textile fabrics) exports approximately 
41% of the turnover, but the share of the profitable sector (described as the share of the fixed assets 
belonging to the profitable firms) is of 44%; Div24 (the chemical and synthetic and artificial fibers 
industry), exports approximately 30% of the turnover, but the share of the profitable sector is of 
40%; Div27 (the metallurgical industry), exports approximately 44% of the turnover, but the share 
of the profitable sector is of only 15%; Div36 (the production of  furniture and other non-classified 
activities), exports approximately 60% of the turnover, but the share of the profitable sector is of 
47%. 
- The manufacturing industry is locally-competitive in the divisions: Div15, Div16, Div22, Div25, 
Div31, Div32, Div34. 
- The manufacturing industry is competitive in the divisions: Div18, Div19, Div20, Div26, Div29, 
Div35, Div37.  
 
It must be stressed that the abolition of customs barrier between Romania and EU will tend to 
change the competitiveness positions of firms, the locally-competitive ones, at least, facing the risk 
of losing their clients.  
 
V.4 Final considerations 
 
Before any considerations concerning the competitiveness of the manufacturing foreign-controlled 
companies, we wish to emphasize three general aspects. 
1. The first one refers to the metallurgical industry. Given the large share of this industry in the 
economy and its major impact on other economic activities, its lack of competitiveness is 
affecting the whole economy. To a great extent the situation of the manufacturing industry will 
depend on solving the problem of this sector. 
2.  Second, we wish to stress that at the level of 1998 but also in the next two years as well, a 
major drawback of the Romanian economy consisted in the high level of unprofitability: 33% of 
the firms were unprofitable, accounting for 50% of the capital in the manufacturing industry. 
The situation is complicated by the big variety of the causes of the companies' losses: objective 
circumstances, manipulation of the accounts aiming to fiscal purposes (especially in the 
domestic private sector), managing the companies according to some personal interests 
(especially in the STATE sector), lack of loyalty towards the own firm (especially in the 
STATE and FOR sectors), the practice of transfer prices, lack of management capabilities, etc.  
3. The ambiguities, gaps and legislative errors, as well as the regulation deficiencies of the 
Romanian economic environment encourage the anti-economic behavior and the insufficiently 
prepared privatization.  
 
The foreign sector in the Romanian manufacturing industry is mainly established in industries that 
locate competitive advantages. However, these industries –according to the development stage of 
Romania based on the production factors– are characterized by low value added (the wood working 
industry, the textile industry, the ready-made clothes industry, the leather and footwear industry). 
Nevertheless, the foreign capital is present as well in industries with relatively higher level of 
processing, such as the production of furniture, the industry of road transport vehicles or the 
chemical industry, showing the existing of potential advantages in these industries. 
 
Using the above presented competitiveness criteria (see C2 in §V.3 of the present chapter), our 
analysis indicates that the foreign sector in the Romanian manufacturing, as a whole, is locally-
competitive. Moreover, there are no divisions where the foreign sector should be significant but 
non-competitive. The foreign firms are better than those controlled by the domestic capital from the 
point of view of the labor and capital productivity, of the export capacity, of the investment 
intensity, of the ability of using subcontracting. On the other hand, however, the structure of the 
foreign sector is less homogeneous and balanced than that of the domestic private sector. Indeed, 
there is an important number of companies that register high losses, exporting intensively in the 
industries that locate competitive advantages for Romania, industries in which other firms (both 
with foreign and with Romanian private capital) operate with high profits. It can be asserted that, in 
the case of these companies, factors that characterize them, related to a poor management, or to 
their strategy, or to making use of transfer prices induce their losses.  
 
It must be stressed, otherwise, that in 1998, the shares of profits of the foreign and Romanian 
private sectors were the same, while the share of losses was higher in FOR sector. Given the 
significantly higher investments, it should be expected that in the following years the economic 
efficiency of the foreign capital to grow more strongly. 
 
As a general conclusion, at present, the foreign sector has a greater ability to take advantage of the 
low costs of some basic production factors, such as the low qualified labor force or the raw 
materials, either under objective terms –when they register profits – or under subjective terms – 
when export intensively and with large losses. At the same time, FDI have important contributions, 
though in relative terms because of their low share in total fixed assets, to exports, investments, 
spillover effects due to subcontracting. Still, the present configuration of FDI in the Romanian 
manufacturing industry, characterized by a low stock value and by the location in industries which 
cannot generate important horizontal spillover effects, doesn't allow for a significant restructuring 
impact. 
 
Possible research developments       
 
Our analysis didn't go beyond the level of NACE divisions and didn't approach the mutual 
influences between industries. One possible direction of developing the present research consists in 
identifying the competitive clusters of activities in Romanian economy (not only industrial 
activities!). 
 
In order to monitor the FDI impact in the Romanian economy and, implicitly, to turn into account 
this study, it would be necessary to carry out a dynamic analysis, on the basis of a periodically 
enrichment of the data-base. A dynamic analysis would make possible the identification of the 
middle and long term trends of the phenomenon. It would also supply the necessary elements for a 
coherent policy of using the FDI inflows as instruments of economic restructuring, and also for 
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ANNEX 1. Methodological remarks: the definitions of used indices and ratios 
  
 Def.1 RAk(X:Y), the aggregate ratio of the variables X and Y conditioned by f=k, the value 
"k" of the  factor f is defined by: 
RAk(X:Y) = XkY / YkX =(Xk/X) / (Yk/Y)=(Xk/Yk) / (X/Y), 
where:    X (respectively Y) is the  sum of the X (respectively Y) values for all entities in the 
aggregation set (in our case, the aggregate sets could be the firms from: manufacturing industry, a 
NACE subsection or division);  
    Xk (respectively Yk) is the  sum of the X (respectively Y) values computed for all entities 
with the value f=k (in our case, the factor f is the ownership type); the sum is calculated in the 
aggregate set. For edit reasons, the tables in the appendix will express the aggregated ratios in 
percentages, that is the value 1 is to be written 100%. 
 
Comments about RAk(X:Y) 
1) The second equality of the above definition is more complicated but it has the advantage to be 
more intuitive: RAk(X:Y) allows to compare the impact of the factor on the variables X and Y. 
2) There is no connection between the values of the ratio and the weight of the level of the factor in 
the aggregation set. 
3) If RAk(X:Y) = 1 then X and Y variables are proportional: Xk / X=Yk / Y. 
4) If the ratio RAk(X:Y) >1, then there is a level "j" of the factor such that RAj(X:Y) <1.  
5) The following series of equivalent relations may be written: 
(Xk/X):(Yk/Y)>1 ⇔ Xk/X>Yk/Y ⇔ Xk/Yk > X/Y. 
The above relations could be viewed in two ways. Thus, a higher than 1 value corresponding to the 
"k"-level of the factor is showing that: a) the "k" level of the factor influences to a greater extent the 
values of the variable X than the values of the variable Y; b) the ratio between the aggregated values 
conditioned by the "k" level of the factor is higher than the ratio between the unconditionally 
aggregated values (computed within the entire aggregate set, irrespective the factor values). The last 
statement could be expressed intuitively but less rigourously: the "k" level of the factor favors 
higher values of the ratio X/Y. 
6) If X describes the production and Y describes a production factor, then X/Y describes the 
productivity of the production factor Y. 
 
Def.2 The allocation diversity ratio attached to the index P is defined by:  













         
where: i = summation index; 
            n = the number of entities considered in the sum; the entities must achieve a partition of the 
reference set, i.e. must be exhaustive and mutually exclusive (example: the reference set is the 
manufacturing industry, the entities are all the 23  divisions of manufacturing industry, n=23) 
  pi = the value of the performance index P in the entity "i"; 
  P = the value of the performance index P in the reference set; 
ai = total value of assets in division "i" for OT; 
            A = total value of assets in the reference set. 
 
ANNEX 2. Synoptic tables 
 
 







EA Div15     Industry of food products and drinks                                                                      
EA Div16     Tobacco industry                                                                                                   
EB Div17     Textile industry and of textile products                                                                 
EB Div18     Industry of textile, fur, leather ready-made clothes                                                
EC Div19     Leather and footwear industry                                                                                
ED Div20     Wood working industry (except production of furniture)                                      
EE Div21     Industry of cellulose, paper, cardboard and of paper and cardboard goods           
EE Div22     Publishing houses, polygraphs and type copying                                                   
EF Div23     Industry of oil processing, coking and nuclear fuel treatment                               
EG Div24     Chemical industry and of synthetic or artificial fibers                                           
EH Div25     Rubber and plastics manufacture                                                                            
EI Div26     Industry of other non-metallic mineral products                                                    
EJ Div27     Metal-working industry                                                                                         
EK Div28     Industry of steel frame constructions and metal products (except machines, 
equipment and installations)                                                                                       
EL Div29     Industry of machines and equipment                                                                      
EM Div30    Industry of office and computing technique equipment                                         
EM Div31     Industry of electric equipment and machines                                                        
EM Div32     Industry of T.V. and radio sets and communication equipments                           
EM Div33     Industry of accuracy medical apparatuses and instruments, optics and watches   
EN Div34     Industry of means of road transport                                                                        
EN Div35    Industry of other means of transport                                                                       
EO Div36     Production of furniture and other non-classified activities                                    






Table A2. Some operation ratios in manufacturing, 
by NACE subsections, year 1998 0) (percentages) 
 
 











FOR STATE Priv  
RO 
FOR 
Total E 96 93 164 93 112 91 
EA 105 80 192 142 92 83 
EB 76 102 121 91 108 84 
EC 86 96 136 106 115 67 
ED 68 105 123 120 104 60 
EE 90 97 193 102 100 94 
EF 122 53   115 60   
EG 64 119 237 77 131 121 
EH 74 103 101 103 101 63 
EI 82 105 119 90 104 101 
EJ 103 67 35 102 78 24 
EK 81 111 136 108 104 57 
EL 92 118 204 101 101 84 
EM 79 101 183 147 113 53 
EN 97 102 151 96 115 109 
EO 72 109 119 101 103 64 
 
0) The source of crude data is INSSE: a sample of 2799 manufacturing companies with at least 50 
employees. 
1) 100% = the index value for the line (subsection, or section) as a whole. The ratio is computed for 
each  (sub) section as the proportion between the specified ownership type index value and the 
index value irrespective the ownership type (see Def.1, Annex 1).   
2) This is the proportion Value Added/ Employees count. 
 
Table A3. The distribution of turnover and fixed assets for profit-making firms, 
aggregated values by prevailing ownership and NACE divisions 
(the manufacturing industry, year 1998) 1) 
 
SPT, The share of profit-
making turnover (%) 2) 
SPA, The share of profit-
making fixed assets (%) 2) 
RKPR, Aggregated 
productivity of capital for 
loss-making firms 3)      
NACE    
COD 
Subsection/ 













Section E 64 44 82 78 49 36 70 62 0.54 0.72 0.51 0.46
EA Div15 78 4) 59 82 81 64 48 72 74 0.50 0.64 0.56 0.67
EA Div16 100 100 5) 100 100 100  100         
EB Div17 63 40 70 89 44 26 59 61 0.46 0.53 0.62 0.19
EB Div18 90 54 95 84 85 35 90 85 0.63 0.46 0.47 1.08
EC Div19 70 36 67 89 55 45 50 84 0.52 1.45 0.49 0.65
ED Div20 68 67 65 76 56 55 55 61 0.60 0.60 0.66 0.49
EE Div21 52 57 38 100 46 61 21 100 0.79 1.18 0.43   
EE Div22 89 100 87 73 85 100 78 65 0.70   0.53 0.69
EF Div23 33 9 99  15 4 95  0.36 0.42 0.19   
EG Div24 69 58 82 81 40 33 50 66 0.30 0.36 0.22 0.46
EH Div25 68 57 69 71 56 34 61 57 0.60 0.39 0.70 0.54
EI Div26 80 49 94 67 74 48 89 73 0.71 0.96 0.52 1.33
EJ Div27 21 20 56 0 15 14 56 0 0.66 0.65 1.00   
EK Div28 62 48 77 20 41 44 68 2 0.43 0.85 0.63 0.08
EL Div29 69 62 90 57 59 57 84 26 0.65 0.81 0.58 0.27
EM Div31 88 69 98 84 78 53 96 66 0.48 0.51 0.49 0.37
EM Div32 98 98 96 100 93 95 99 85 0.27 0.39 4.13
EM Div33 69 29 86  42 23 87  0.33 0.73 1.09   
EN Div34 75 67 86 100 57 40 74 100 0.44 0.33 0.46   
EN Div35 69 68 92  54 56 85  0.53 0.60 0.49   
EO Div36 70 51 74 84 47 40 48 80 0.38 0.64 0.32 0.76
EO Div37 86  87 100 60  62 100 0.24   0.24   
1) The source of crude data is INSSE: a sample of 2799 manufacturing companies with at least 50 
employees. 
 2) 100%= total value (profit-making and loss-making firms) for specified subsection and specified 
ownership; see the example 4) , below. 
3) 1= aggregate capital productivity of the profit-making firms, for subsection and specified 
ownership type; see the definition of RKPR, the capital productivity ratio as the proportion 
between the aggregated capital productivity of the loss-making and profit-making sectors. 
4) As it concerns STATE firms of the subsection EA, 59% from aggregate turnover belongs to 
profit-making firms (and respectively, 100%-59% to loss-making firms). For all STATE firms 
(irrespective the subsection) the percentage is 44%, and for all the firms from EA (irrespective the 
ownership type) the percentage is 78%. 
5) There are no firms for specified subsection and ownership type.  
Table A4. The frequency of profit-making firms and the capital ratio, 
by prevailing ownership and NACE divisions 
(the manufacturing industry, year 1998)1) 
 
The sample structure:  
firms count 
 The frequency of profit-
making firms 
(%) 2)  
Average capital of the loss-
making firms  
RK 3)      
NACE    
COD 
Subsection/ 













Section E 2780 717 1680 383 67 45 76 68 2,09 1,46 1,33 1,31
EA Div15 562 142 349 71 59 36 69 58 0,82 0,61 0,88 0,48
EA Div16 2 1 0 1 100 100 100     4)       
EB Div17 225 71 132 22 52 27 65 59 1,40 1,04 1,30 0,92
EB Div18 349 12 231 106 81 33 86 76 0,77 0,93 0,69 0,57
EC Div19 149 8 83 58 73 38 72 79 2,23 0,73 2,61 0,73
ED Div20 130 13 95 22 70 54 76 55 1,83 0,95 2,56 0,85
EE Div21 36 11 20 5 61 45 60 100 1,84 0,53 5,64   
EE Div22 68 8 53 7 76 100 77 43 0,57   0,96 0,40
EF Div23 10 4 6 60 25 83 0 8,50 8,00 0,26   
EG Div24 102 39 47 16 58 31 74 75 2,06 0,90 2,92 1,55
EH Div25 64 11 44 9 63 36 66 78 1,31 1,11 1,24 2,64
EI Div26 160 48 105 7 76 58 86 57 1,13 1,52 0,74 0,49
EJ Div27 74 49 21 4 43 33 71 25 4,32 2,98 1,96   
EK Div28 180 52 117 11 68 52 79 36 3,11 1,37 1,73 0,28
EL Div29 216 121 88 7 69 62 81 57 1,58 1,23 0,80 3,79
EM Div30 1 1  0 0         
EM Div31 51 14 27 10 76 50 93 70 0,92 0,89 0,52 1,20
EM Div32 20 6 9 5 85 83 89 80 0,43 0,26 0,08 0,71
EM Div33 27 11 16 59 27 81 0 2,01 1,26 0,65   
EN Div34 61 22 36 3 79 64 86 100 2,79 2,63 2,18   
EN Div35 50 30 19 1 74 67 89  0 2,42 1,57 1,50   
EO Div36 213 41 155 17 62 32 70 71 1,87 0,70 2,49 0,60
EO Div37 30 2 27 1 70  0 74 100 1,56   1,75   
1) The source of crude data is INSSE: a sample of 2799 manufacturing companies with at least 50 
employees. 
2) 100%= total frequency for specified subsection and specified ownership type. 
3) 1= the average capital of the profit-making firm, for specified subsection and ownership type. See 
the definition of the capital ratio, RK: the proportion between the average capital of the loss-making 
firms and the average capital of the profit-making firms.  
4) There are no firms for specified subsection and ownership type. 
 
Table A5. The share of losses and profits in turnover, 
by prevailing ownership and NACE divisions 
(the manufacturing industry, year 1998)1) 
 
Loss-making firms:  
Losses share in turnover 
 (%) 2) 
Profit-making firms:  
 Profit share in turnover 
 (%) 3) 
Profitability 4)      NACE    
COD 
Subsection/ 













Section E 18.03 17.66 17.12 22.78 8.17 4.56 9.83 9.98 -1.29 -7.85 5.03 2.77
EA Div15 25.28 43.43 17.20 21.19 8.13 7.91 8.37 7.75 .83 -13.05 3.64 2.26
EA Div16 5)   4.96 5.41 2.03 4.96 5.41  2.03
EB Div17 27.76 36.45 19.80 27.07 6.26 3.07 7.02 6.68 -6.17 -20.51 -1.07 2.93
EB Div18 15.68 19.24 25.90 9.58 16.60 1.82 16.63 17.18 13.44 -7.91 14.60 12.81
EC Div19 18.36 22.39 17.18 14.47 14.16 3.71 10.01 20.31 4.54 -12.93 1.03 16.38
ED Div20 21.04 40.88 15.91 33.64 9.77 2.52 7.53 19.29 -.22 -11.70 -.66 6.73
EE Div21 24.15 44.97 9.76 7.70 2.73 13.56 11.35 -7.62 -17.61 -.87 11.35
EE Div22 12.28  13.30 10.77 17.68 29.96 11.43 8.42 14.28 29.96 8.16 3.23
EF Div23 22.84 22.86 13.43 2.73 .02 3.39 -14.53 -20.89 3.29  
EG Div24 23.38 23.23 12.43 38.61 8.49 2.19 14.64 11.38 -1.37 -8.59 9.75 1.80
EH Div25 11.24 19.10 10.29 8.79 6.08 .57 5.96 16.53 .52 -7.98 .89 9.31
EI Div26 13.95 15.22 18.34 3.41 10.85 3.81 13.04 3.75 5.94 -5.83 11.26 1.39
EJ Div27 8.79 8.13 29.48 12.13 3.96 3.78 5.32 13.91 -6.16 -5.75 -10.08 -12.02
EK Div28 30.94 20.69 20.46 69.37 10.75 3.84 12.94 11.15 -4.95 -8.98 5.24 -53.40
EL Div29 22.38 22.53 25.77 18.35 5.72 4.52 7.49 8.21 -3.11 -5.81 4.24 -3.09
EM Div31 20.27 26.73 17.72 5.50 10.47 6.73 8.12 21.87 6.84 -3.49 7.60 17.58
EM Div32 53.93 8.62 61.03 82.13 9.83 15.59 9.24 7.99 8.64 15.11 6.32 7.62
EM Div33 19.55 26.20 5.38 8.78 5.08 9.30 -.04 -17.17 7.23  
EN Div34 27.18 28.12 17.03 3.03 1.31 9.19 3.30 -4.63 -8.31 5.39 3.30
EN Div35 23.65 22.52 1.59 35.73 8.51 6.67 14.38 -1.48 -2.67 13.10 -35.73
EO Div36 21.72 23.15 19.40 52.38 8.84 3.94 10.05 5.58 -.19 -9.26 2.54 -3.79
EO Div37 4.03 3.98 4.03 7.55 7.57 6.66 5.92 -3.98 6.05 6.66
1) The source of crude data is INSSE: a sample of 2799 manufacturing companies with at least 50 
employees. 
2) 100%= the total value of the turnover of loss-making firms, aggregated for specified NACE 
division and specified ownership type. 
3) 100%= the total value of the turnover of profit-making firms, aggregated for specified NACE 
division and specified ownership type. 
4) 100%= the total value of the turnover, aggregated for specified NACE division and specified 
ownership type. Profitability = 100 x (profits-losses) / turnover. 
5) There are no firms for specified subsection and ownership type.  
Table A6. The share of exports in turnover, 
by losses/profits, prevailing ownership and NACE divisions 
(the manufacturing industry, year 1998) 1) 
 
Loss-making firms:   
exports share  in turnover 
(%)2) 
Profit-making firms:   
exports share  in turnover 
(%)3) 
All firms: 
 exports share  in turnover 
(%)4) 
NACE    
COD 
Subsection/ 













Section E 32.25 33.69 24.92 36.03 22.89 23.33 23.11 21.51 26.26 29.12 23.44 24.71
EA Div15 3.88 .89 7.01 1.24 2.82 3.74 3.94 .35 3.05 2.58 4.51 .52
EA Div16 5)    .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
EB Div17 40.46 37.36 40.25 88.60 40.97 31.89 39.85 57.18 40.78 35.16 39.97 60.68
EB Div18 78.09 37.71 63.93 93.38 77.60 75.99 74.42 84.21 77.65 58.32 73.92 85.70
EC Div19 55.99 48.87 50.95 92.78 45.74 38.06 52.45 39.68 48.77 44.95 51.96 45.69
ED Div20 44.36 33.59 42.37 61.39 43.90 19.73 50.57 34.74 44.05 24.27 47.70 41.06
EE Div21 29.85 32.02 28.34 10.83 15.34 2.57 14.03 19.97 22.45 18.51 14.03
EE Div22 .00  .01 .00 1.45 .00 2.88 .06 1.29 .00 2.50 .05
EF Div23 38.91 39.00 .00 3.11 .00 3.86 27.28 35.65 3.84
EG Div24 27.11 31.31 6.42 30.35 29.47 40.03 13.99 31.92 28.74 36.33 12.62 31.62
EH Div25 16.38 22.20 16.24 2.55 19.87 24.31 20.14 8.04 18.75 23.39 18.93 6.48
EI Div26 17.54 11.23 46.48 9.79 25.32 15.63 28.26 16.16 23.78 13.40 29.29 14.06
EJ Div27 38.24 38.40 5.82 50.66 43.82 46.53 20.99 94.29 39.39 40.02 14.28 50.86
EK Div28 35.72 22.02 46.83 43.98 18.73 12.26 21.38 4.84 25.13 17.36 27.25 36.22
EL Div29 41.79 41.15 18.36 66.09 26.56 27.48 19.72 54.68 31.34 32.70 19.59 59.53
EM Div31 21.15 21.25 .53 28.27 22.37 20.56 26.88 9.66 22.23 20.77 26.35 12.58
EM Div32 2.15 10.49 .00 .00 8.42 6.14 15.75 4.72 8.30 6.23 15.09 4.70
EM Div33 17.78 22.45 7.82 8.86 20.88 7.15 11.64 21.99 7.24
EN Div34 5.89 4.04 25.79 9.52 4.47 5.00 30.75 8.60 4.33 8.01 30.75
EN Div35 58.25 54.17 3.25 94.66 34.51 40.02 16.90 41.88 44.54 15.81 94.66
EO Div36 54.78 47.73 56.60 89.12 59.86 49.98 63.28 42.68 58.36 48.88 61.57 50.19
EO Div37 18.81 .00 20.77 26.47 26.86 .00 25.39 .00 26.06 .00
1) The source of crude data is INSSE: a sample of 2799 manufacturing companies with at least 50 
employees. 
2) 100%= the total value of the turnover of loss-making firms, aggregated for specified NACE 
division and specified ownership type. 
3) 100%= the total value of the turnover of profit-making firms, aggregated for specified NACE 
division and specified ownership type. 
4) 100%= the total value of the turnover, aggregated for specified NACE division and specified 
ownership type.  
5) There are no firms for specified subsection and ownership type.  
 
Table A7. Investments share, 
by losses/profits, prevailing ownership and NACE divisions 
(the manufacturing industry, year 1998) 1) 
 
Loss-making firms:   
  The share of investment in 
turnover (%) 2) 
Profit-making firms: 
 The share of investment in 
turnover (%) 3) 
All firms :  
The share of investment in 
turnover (%) 4) 
NACE    
COD 
Subsection/ 













Section E 8.41 7.42 10.71 11.58 11.45 5.14 8.30 30.18 10.38 6.36 8.75 26.11
EA Div15 6.72 3.78 7.51 7.51 10.21 12.24 7.19 14.92 9.65 9.48 7.28 13.75
EA Div16 5)   5.20 3.59 15.88 5.20 3.59 15.88
EB Div17 12.49 14.96 7.89 47.99 5.97 2.23 6.05 10.26 8.32 9.59 6.60 14.41
EB Div18 11.50 2.94 20.36 8.69 8.21 .52 8.52 7.94 8.54 1.64 9.12 8.04
EC Div19 4.89 6.39 3.06 9.75 7.07 2.05 5.35 9.81 6.45 4.57 4.62 9.80
ED Div20 9.99 1.15 7.75 22.23 5.87 1.25 6.38 5.74 7.20 1.28 6.91 9.65
EE Div21 12.82 .63 24.19 6.30 6.30 6.28 6.39 8.64 4.22 13.82 6.39
EE Div22 5.54  5.23 5.37 15.75 27.40 12.11 9.90 14.94 27.40 11.61 8.68
EF Div23 3.79 2.85  2.48 .13 3.05 3.02 2.61 3.63
EG Div24 9.62 4.60 7.86 34.71 5.12 3.45 5.08 8.08 6.47 4.14 5.58 13.19
EH Div25 12.59 .68 13.78 1.57 5.93 1.63 5.40 20.84 7.88 1.35 7.84 15.35
EI Div26 7.96 1.97 22.09 15.95 13.59 2.44 14.83 21.76 12.42 2.21 15.22 19.84
EJ Div27 9.15 9.63 4.44 2.68 4.47 4.49 5.34 2.03 8.20 8.67 4.94 2.68
EK Div28 2.11 1.20 3.91 1.24 16.14 3.00 20.31 2.55 10.93 1.98 16.92 1.49
EL Div29 3.58 2.63 16.87 1.31 9.15 7.55 12.70 5.85 7.39 5.66 13.14 3.92
EM Div31 3.21 3.08 7.19 2.15 9.30 1.31 8.49 19.67 8.60 1.84 8.40 16.93
EM Div32 .32 .52  5.88 3.92 7.08 5.35 6.37 3.70 7.64 6.67
EM Div33 101.7 94.42 117.3 3.27 1.04 3.59 33.92 67.46 19.68
EN Div34 5.63 3.01 34.63 46.83 3.47 5.16 221.5 37.14 3.35 8.88 221.5
EN Div35 8.38 1.79 4.94 36.11 2.66 2.19 4.11 4.24 2.08 4.18 36.11
EO Div36 8.40 .65 10.94 22.69 7.00 3.16 7.31 10.41 7.46 1.96 8.19 12.40
EO Div37 3.12 26.26 1.69 4.16 3.95 18.27 4.06 26.26 3.61 18.27
1) The source of crude data is INSSE: a sample of 2799 manufacturing companies with at least 50 
employees. 
2) 100%= the total value of the turnover of loss-making firms, aggregated for specified NACE 
division and specified ownership type. 
3) 100%= the total value of the turnover of profit-making firms, aggregated for specified NACE 
division and specified ownership type. 
4) 100%= the total value of the turnover, aggregated for specified NACE division and specified 
ownership type.  
5) There are no firms for specified subsection and ownership type.  
 
Table A8. Materials 0) share in turnover, 
by losses/profits, prevailing ownership and NACE divisions 
(the manufacturing industry, year 1998) 1) 
 
Loss-making firms:   
  The share of materials in 
turnover (%)2) 
Profit-making firms:   
  The share of materials in 
turnover (%)3) 
All firms :  
The share of investment in 
turnover (%) 4) 
NACE    
COD 
Subsection/ 













Section E 69 72 64 55 54 60 52 47 59 67 54 48
EA Div15 64 78 65 46 54 71 59 39 56 74 60 41
EA Div16 5)    44 37  88 44 37  88
EB Div17 62 65 63 22 53 61 53 45 56 63 56 42
EB Div18 27 40 39 18 17 20 19 13 18 29 20 14
EC Div19 46 48 49 35 43 59 40 45 44 52 43 44
ED Div20 60 62 58 66 49 53 50 47 53 56 53 51
EE Div21 73 84 64  62 74 56 31 67 79 61 31
EE Div22 47  49 45 28 22 28 44 30 22 30 44
EF Div23 72 72 83  75 86 72  73 73 72  
EG Div24 64 62 82 52 56 63 51 52 59 63 56 52
EH Div25 72 69 73 58 62 61 62 57 65 64 65 57
EI Div26 57 59 48 57 51 59 50 46 52 59 50 50
EJ Div27 80 80 95 81 76 78 65 49 80 80 78 81
EK Div28 52 45 57 58 48 53 46 43 50 49 49 55
EL Div29 55 53 57 66 51 51 49 57 52 52 50 61
EM Div31 51 47 47 60 53 53 55 51 53 51 54 52
EM Div32 81 39 95 63 54 38 55 59 54 38 57 59
EM Div33 49 41 68  39 52 38  42 43 42  
EN Div34 67 67 63  68 67 51 84 67 67 53 84
EN Div35 52 51 43 59 50 51 47  51 51 46 59
EO Div36 62 59 63 65 54 56 53 62 56 57 55 63
EO Div37 36 57 34  46  46 9 44 57 45 9
 0) Materials: the value of the raw materials and consumption materials –including power, water and 
other material expenses. 
 1) The source of crude data is INSSE: a sample of 2799 manufacturing companies with at least 50 
employees. 
2) 100%= the total value of the turnover of loss-making firms, aggregated for specified NACE 
division and specified ownership type. 
3) 100%= the total value of the turnover of profit-making firms, aggregated for specified NACE 
division and specified ownership type. 
4) 100%= the total value of the turnover, aggregated for specified NACE division and specified 
ownership type.  
5) There are no firms for specified subsection and ownership type.  
